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THE LASTING IMPACT OF EARLY LIFE INEQUALITIES
Howard Ray Miller, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This dissertation analyzes how early inequalities in health and education affect later educa-
tional, health, and social and emotional outcomes. I place particular emphasis on how the
unique economic circumstances of the developing world interact with the dynamic and mul-
tidimensional nature of child development. In Chapter 1, I build a theory of human capital
formation that links early health differences to observed schooling gaps across countries. My
main finding is that early health inequalities are amplified into large schooling gaps within
and across countries. In Chapter 2, I use a unique Indian data set to link private school
attendance to measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem and find that private school may play
at least as significant a role in early psychosocial as in cognitive development. Finally, in
Chapter 3, I construct a novel measure of seasonal food scarcity and find that prenatal expo-
sure to scarcity has a lasting impact on childhood health in Ethiopia. Overall, my findings
highlight the importance of understanding the dynamic and multidimensional nature of child
development for effective targeting of policy interventions in the developing world.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes how early inequalities in health and education affect later edu-
cational, health, and social and emotional outcomes. Moreover, it centers around the view
that child development is a dynamic and multidimensional process. I apply insights from
the literature on child skill formation to examine how alternate facets and stages of devel-
opment interact to determine economic success individually and as an economy. The level
and inequality of inputs during critical stages of development may be a particular concern
in economies with limited resources for later remediation and/or with substantial wealth
disparities. In light of this, I place a particular focus on the lasting impact of early life
inequalities in the developing world. Isolating the critical facets and stages of child devel-
opment in the context of developing countries can help policymakers target cost-effective
interventions towards some of the world’s most vulnerable populations.
The structure of this dissertation is divided into three chapters that cover overlapping
but distinct aspects of early life inequalities in the developing world. Chapter 1 begins by
developing a quantitative theory of human capital to investigate the role of early childhood
health in determining schooling attainment gaps within and across countries. While individ-
uals are assumed to differ in their learning ability and access to financial resources, countries
differ in public subsidies to health and education, financial development, and relative factor
and human capital investment prices. My main finding is that early health inequalities are
amplified into large schooling gaps within and across countries—raising investments for all
children to equalize early health within countries reduces schooling Ginis by an average of
1
12% in developing economies and reduces the cross-country standard deviation of average
schooling attainment by over 19%. A key policy takeaway is that the gains from early health
interventions tend to be amplified by later educational investments in developing economies,
while those targeting school-aged children may be limited if early health conditions are ig-
nored. These findings reinforce the notion of child health policy as an effective educational
policy tool.
While Chapter 1 explores the link between early health and later schooling choices in
the developing world, Chapter 2 examines the impact of early educational investments on a
child’s social and emotional traits. In recent years, economists have paid increasing atten-
tion to the importance of social and emotional skills on a variety economic and behavioral
outcomes. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that schooling is intimately linked
to the development of such noncognitive traits. In Chapter 2, I examine a previously un-
explored mechanism by using a unique Indian data set to link private school attendance to
early noncognitive outcomes. I find that the effects of attending private school between age
five and eight on self-efficacy and self-esteem are within the range of credible estimates of
effects on cognitive outcomes in India, suggesting that private school may play at least as
significant a role in early psychosocial as in cognitive development. Moreover, effects differ
by observable characteristics such as gender, urbanization, caste, household wealth, and ma-
ternal measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem. I also find that effects may differ between
children who are similar in their observed characteristics based on unobserved differences in
cognitive ability, health, and social skill. These results highlight the importance of moving
beyond traditional cognitive measures and average treatment effects to examine potential
variation in noncognitive gains from policy interventions in the developing world.
Finally, Chapter 3 of this dissertation shifts from educational and noncognitive outcomes
to explore the impact of early inequalities on later health outcomes. Specifically, I analyze
the impact of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity on childhood health in Ethiopia.
I construct a novel measure of seasonal exposure based on reported months of relative food
2
scarcity in the local community. I find that exposure has a significant negative impact on
height by age five that strengthen by age eight. Effects decrease with household wealth and
maternal education and are stronger during the first trimester of gestation. In contrast to
height, effects on child body mass are only identified closer to birth and when exposure is
concentrated in the second trimester. Overall, results highlight that in addition to the effects
of severe famine conditions identified in many studies, more regular variation in prenatal food
availability can have lasting impacts on health in the developing world.
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1. EARLY CHILDHOOD HEALTH AND
SCHOOLING ATTAINMENT GAPS WITHIN AND
ACROSS COUNTRIES
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Children of poor health tend to be outperformed by their healthier counterparts on educa-
tional outcomes ranging from test scores, to absenteeism, to grade levels completed (Currie
2009, Behrman 1996). These educational gaps are particularly well documented in the devel-
oping world where early childhood malnourishment is prevalent among a much larger portion
of the population. At the same time, large and persistent schooling attainment gaps also
exist across countries (see Figure 1.1). This implies that if early health investments impact
later educational choices, they may be an important source of cross-country variation in
schooling. In light of these observations, this chapter examines to what extent early child-
hood health differences can explain schooling attainment gaps within and across countries.
My strategy for investigating the relationship between health and schooling is to build
a quantitative theory of human capital that predicts endogenous investments in early child-
hood health as well as later investments in education.1 To study the influence of early health
1By explicitly considering child health, my work builds on and complements a growing body of empirical
macro literature that more broadly examines cross-country differences in human capital accumulation (e.g.
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Figure 1.1: Cross-Country Dispersion of Schooling. Source: PWT 7.2 and Barro and Lee
(2010) for population aged 24-29.
inequalities within and across countries, I extend heterogeneity along each dimension. Specif-
ically, while agents within an economy differ in their available financial resources as well as
learning ability, countries are assumed to differ in public subsidies to health and education,
financial development, and relative factor and human capital investment prices. In congru-
ence with the empirical evidence, I model early health and later educational investments as
complements in the production of human capital. This dynamic complementarity combined
with credit frictions allows for the key mechanism linking early childhood health to schooling
gaps in the model. Specifically, poor financially constrained parents invest fewer resources in
the health of their young children than richer parents. This, in part, results in less schooling
later in childhood due to the complementarity between early health and education. In other
words, early health inequalities are amplified by later educational investments.
The theory allows for quantitative analysis in a general equilibrium setting to determine
the extent that early health differences ultimately impact schooling choices. Operationaliz-
Bils and Klenow 2000; Erosa et al. 2010; Manuelli and Seshadri 2014; Cordoba and Ripoll 2013; Restuccia
and Vandenbroucke 2014).
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ing the model relies on estimating a number of key parameters governing the production of
human capital, such as the complementarity between early health and educational invest-
ments. However, because there is little micro evidence to directly pin down many of these
parameters, I restrict them to match a number of cross-sectional data moments from the
United States. In this manner, within-country heterogeneity is also helpful for empirically
restricting key parameters of the model. After careful calibration, I quantitatively assess
the ability of the model to account for the empirical data on schooling inequality within
and across a sample of countries. Overall, the model performs quite well as the correla-
tion between the model predictions and the data is 0.87 for country-level average schooling
attainment and 0.73 for schooling Gini coefficients. The model also predicts 97% of the
standard deviation of schooling attainment and 71% of the standard deviation of schooling
Ginis across countries.
Quantitative analysis using the calibrated model yields two main findings. First, early
health inequalities are amplified into large schooling differences within developing countries.
Counterfactually raising investments for all children to equalize early health within-countries
reduces schooling Ginis by 12% and increases schooling attainment by 28% on average. This
occurs because the increase in early health raises the productivity of later educational invest-
ments due to complementarities, particularly for the children of poor, financially constrained
parents. This amplification effect is much smaller in higher income countries where fewer
parents are constrained and most children are healthy enough in the baseline to realize gains
from attending school for a significant length of time. In these countries, further increases
in early health levels are accompanied by smaller changes in schooling due to the decreasing
returns and increasing opportunity costs of attending school.
My second main finding is that early health inequalities are an important source of
schooling variation across countries. As a result of the differing effects across national income
levels, the above experiment not only reduces schooling gaps in developing countries, it also
results in more than a 19% reduction in the cross-country standard deviation of average
6
schooling attainment across the full sample. When I extend the analysis further by equating
early health for all children in all countries to the average U.S. level, the standard deviation
of average schooling attainment is 53% lower than the baseline. This occurs predominately
due to a nearly 50% increase in average schooling among developing countries. In these
economies, early health levels are relatively low for all children in the baseline, thus increasing
to U.S. levels results in a sharp rise of the productivity of later educational investments. In
higher income countries, the effect on schooling is again considerably smaller due to the
already high levels of initial early health.
In addition to my main counterfactual analysis, the model is also well suited to examine
the comparative effects of early health versus education subsidies on human capital invest-
ments. Specifically, I find that early health interventions in the developing world tend to
have larger impacts on schooling and other outcomes than later educational interventions.
In a set of policy experiments, an increase in early health subsides increases schooling by
more than double — and log-output by more than triple — a cost-equivalent increase in
later subsidies to educational spending. Due to the dynamic nature of child development,
increasing early health subsidies induces higher levels and less inequality in early health
investments and later educational investments. However, while the increase in educational
subsidies has a large effect on educational quality expenditures, it has much smaller effects
on early health investments and schooling time. Intuitively, while poor families invest more
in educational quality because it is cheaper, due to financial constraints they are unable to
adjust earlier investments in health to fully take advantage of complementarities. A key
policy takeaway is that gains from early health interventions tend to be amplified by later
educational investments in developing economies, while those targeting school-aged children
may be limited if early health conditions are ignored.
This chapter contributes to several lines of literature as it is the first to combine early
health investments, dynamic complementarity, credit frictions, and heterogeneity within and
across countries. A number of papers investigate the role of credit frictions when child
7
development is explicitly modeled as a dynamic process (e.g. Restuccia and Urrutia 2004;
Caucutt and Lochner 2006; Cunha et al. 2006; Cunha and Heckman 2007; Cunha et al.
2010; Caucutt and Lochner 2012). Indeed, the human capital technology I employ is based
on the theoretic work that has emerged from this research. In general, this line of literature
finds evidence of strong dynamic complementarity over childhood and meaningful effects of
credit constraints. However, this chapter is the first to extend the theoretic framework in a
cross-country setting and to explicitly consider health investments.2
Although to my knowledge no existing models explicitly attempt to link within-country
inequality to cross-country schooling differences, this chapter is related to a number of others
that more generally examine cross-country differences in human capital accumulation. In the
model most closely related to mine, Erosa et al. (2010) assess how human capital and pro-
ductivity interact in order to explain cross-country income differences utilizing a model with
heterogeneity within and across countries. However, health investments are not considered
and childhood is modeled over one period—negating the effects of dynamic complementar-
ity of investments. Although not the focus of the paper, their model does not effectively
explain the distribution of average schooling attainment across countries and within-country
schooling inequality is not reported outside the U.S. benchmark economy.
In other complementary work, Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) abstract from within-country
heterogeneity in a model with credit frictions and find that fertility and mortality differ-
ences play important roles in explaining the cross-country dispersion of schooling attainment.
While the model does well in explaining the overall world distribution of average schooling
attainment, the dynamic nature of child development is not considered and, without het-
erogeneous agents, the model is unable to produce within-country educational inequality.
Finally, Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) consider a production technology for human capital
2As discussed in a briefing by James Heckman (2006), a natural extension of his model of skill formation
would be to include child health stocks. Heckman notes that literature on the economics of child development
and the economics of health have largely grown in isolation from each other. He argues that augmenting
his proposed technology of skill formation with health stocks would effectively create a model of “capacity”
formation that could unite the two fields. This chapter essentially takes a step in that direction.
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specific to early childhood and find support for cross-country differences in human capital
stocks by age six due to the dynamic complementarity of investments. However, the model
abstracts from credit frictions and within-country heterogeneity and is unable to account for
the observed cross-country dispersion of average schooling attainment.3
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows. Section 1.2 begins by providing
some additional discussion and evidence linking education and early health. Section 1.3
builds the economic framework of the model, and Section 1.4 describes the calibration strat-
egy. Section 1.5 provides the baseline results of the quantitative analysis, while Section 1.6
presents a series of counterfactual exercises. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. EDUCATION AND EARLY CHILDHOOD HEALTH
There is a growing body of evidence that early childhood health can have a significant
effect on future life outcomes, including cognitive development and investments in education
(Yamauchi 2008; Currie and Almond 2011; Todd and Winters 2011; Currie and Vogl 2013).
Perhaps the most convincing evidence stems from a number of experimental studies showing
that childhood health interventions can have a direct causal effect on educational outcomes
in the developing world. For example, several randomized trials found that nutritional
supplement programs had large impacts on test scores and schooling attainment for children
in Guatemala (Pollitt et al. 1993; Maluccio et al. 2009) and Jamaica (Grantham-McGregor
et al. 1991). In another well known study, Miguel and Kremer (2004) show that a deworming
program in Kenya greatly increased school attendance. Overall, there is strong micro-level
support for a mechanism in which early childhood health has a meaningful impact on later
educational investment decisions.
In addition to the empirical micro evidence linking early health to education, Table 1.1
3See Cordoba and Ripoll (2013) for a series of experiments showing this inability.
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provides some correlations at the country-level to gauge if my mechanism is consistent with
patterns observed in aggregated data. Specifically, results are shown for a number of cross-
country regressions on average years of schooling for 25-29 year olds.4 These results should
be viewed as simple correlational relationships that serve to motivate my modeling choices
and provide support for the mechanism driving the results of my quantitative analysis.
The results displayed in column (1) reconfirm the positive relationship between schooling
attainment and national income levels shown in Figure 1.1. The remaining specifications
explore the relationship between schooling attainment, financial development, early health,
and inequality.
Table 1.1: Dependent Variable: Average Years of Schooling (age 25-29)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP 2.050*** 1.554** 0.936** 0.616**
(0.258) (0.278) (0.294) (0.213)
FD 0.016*** 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Stunting -0.062*** -0.040***
(0.019) (0.014)
Wasting -0.079* -0.002
(0.041) (0.031)
Sch Gini -9.474***
(1.082)
Obs 91 91 91 91
R2 0.869 0.887 0.908 0.953
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations weighted by country
population. Includes year and region dummies.
As credit frictions play an important role in my theory, I first examine the relationship
between average schooling attainment and a country’s level of financial development (FD).
Here I follow the financial development literature by using data from the World Bank on
domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for credit market
efficiency. Column (2) shows that the average years of schooling in the young adult pop-
4Schooling data is from Barro and Lee (2010) for 2005 if available, else 2000.
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ulation is positively associated with the financial development proxy. This provides some
preliminary evidence that deeper financial markets may help alleviate the extent to which
borrowing constraints bind, allowing higher average investment in human capital over the
life-cycle.
Next I attempt to more directly explore the relationship between cross-country measures
of early childhood health and average schooling attainment. However, comprehensive mea-
sures of health are not available across countries; therefore, as a proxy I use World Bank
data on stunting and wasting prevalence in children under five.5 Column (3) adds these
variables to the previous specification. Quantitatively speaking, a one standard deviation
decrease in the prevalence of stunting (15.9%) or wasting (5.2%) is associated with an in-
crease in average schooling of 1.0 or 0.4 years—both statistically significant relationships.
Note that these measures are somewhat ambiguous in terms of how they relate to overall
health distributions within a country. They are most likely capturing a combination of av-
erage early health stocks and health inequalities within the country. In either case, I view
these relationships as consistent with a mechanism in which poor early health results in less
schooling over childhood. Note also that the coefficient on financial development falls to an
insignificant level after adding the health measures. This suggests that early health may be
a relevant channel through which credit frictions affect educational investment decisions.
Finally column (4) adds a schooling Gini coefficient to the regression.6 First note that
there is a strong negative relationship between schooling inequality and average attainment
even after controlling for income levels.7 The relationship is also quantitatively meaningful—
a one standard deviation reduction in the schooling Gini (0.18) is associated with an increase
in average schooling of 1.7 years. Second notice that the estimated coefficient on wasting
5Prevalence of child stunting is the percentage of children under age 5 whose height-for-age is more
than two standard deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 0-59 months.
Wasting is defined analogously using weight-for-height.
6Schooling Gini coefficient calculated for each country with procedure proposed by Castello and Domenech
(2002). Similar to an income Gini, the coefficient takes values from 0 to 1, with a higher value reflecting
more inequality in schooling attainment.
7For further evidence, see Thomas et al. 2002; Castello and Domenech 2002; Castello-Climent 2010.
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prevalence falls to near zero while that on stunting falls by roughly 65%. This is generally
consistent with the mechanism examined in my model. Namely, the effects of early health
inequalities on average schooling attainment can be capture through their effects on schooling
inequality.
1.3. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Consider a world in which each country is a closed economy populated by a large number
of households that each consist of overlapping generations of a family. Family members
are altruistic towards each other and make decisions as a single economic unit. Over time,
children in the family grow up, have children of their own, and eventually replace their
parents in the household. In this way each household in the economy is an infinitely lived
dynasty. As children grow up, they accumulate human capital through both early health
and later educational investments.
The key feature of the model is that investments take place over multiple periods and
that individuals cannot fully borrow across periods to finance additional investments. This
allows the model to capture the important interaction between borrowing constraints and
the dynamic complementarity of human capital investments early in life. My quantitative
analysis will focus on stationary equilibrium in each economy where prices and the aggregate
behavior of households are constant over time. As such, I omit time subscripts from the
description of the model and use only a prime superscript to denote variables one time
period ahead.
1.3.1 Demographic Structure
Individuals live through four stages of life, in which they are referred to as a child (conception
to age 6) , youth (age 7-30), adult (age 31-54), and elder (age 55-78), respectively. Early
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health investments are made during childhood, which is assumed to last from conception
until formal schooling begins. As a youth, an individual goes to school then eventually
begins working in the labor market. Also, near the end of the stage, a youth conceives a
child of their own (at real age 23). As an adult and an elder, an individual simply works
and eventually retires. The full life-cycle of an individual is shown in the first row of Figure
1.2. The last column shows members of a household at any given point in time.
−−︸︷︷︸
Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y outh
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
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−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
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−−︸︷︷︸
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−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
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−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
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. . .
−−︸︷︷︸
Child
−−−−−−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y outh
. . .
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Child
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Figure 1.2: Generations of a Dynasty
1.3.2 Final Good Production
Households are assumed to derive utility from the consumption of a single final good. Ag-
gregate output of the final good Y is assumed to be produced by a representative firm using
the technology:
Y = AKαH1−α α ∈ (0, 1) , (1.1)
where K and H are the aggregate physical and human capital used in the final goods sector,
and A is total factor productivity (TFP). Final goods can be consumed (C), invested in
physical capital (IK) , or invested in human capital (IH):
Y = C + IK + IH .
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Finally, letting δ equal per-period depreciation, the law of motion of physical capital is given
by:
K ′ = (1− δ)K + IK .
1.3.3 Human Capital Production
Most cross-country models of human capital investments have relied on the simplifying as-
sumption that time spent as a child can be represented as a single period. This implicitly
assumes that inputs in the production of human capital are perfect substitutes over all stages
of childhood. In contrast, recent evidence suggests that human capital accumulation is a
dynamic process that begins early in life and interacts over multiple stages.8 In line with
this view, I use a production framework that allows health investments made during early
childhood to augment and affect the productivity of investments at later ages. Specifically,
human capital is accumulated through investments in early childhood health (i > 0) followed
by later investments in education (e ≥ 0). Together, these inputs produce human capital
according to the following production function:
h = [piiν + (1− pi) (λ+ e)ν ] 1ν ,
where ν ≤ 1, pi ∈ [0, 1] , λ > 0.
The parameter pi is what Cunha and Heckman (2007) call a “skill multiplier,” which
reflects the impact early investments have on human capital accumulation by both augment-
ing and increasing productivity of later investments. The parameter ν governs the degree of
dynamic complementarity of investments, or how easy it is to make up for low investments
in one period with investments in the other. Finally, the parameter λ allows some return to
8See Cunha et al. (2006) for an extensive review of the empirical literature and theoretic foundations
for modeling human capital skill formation as a multi-stage process. See Cunha (2005); Todd and Wolpin
(2007); Del Boca et al. (2014) for additional evidence.
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early health investments even if a youth invests little or nothing in education. This is a key
parameter for predicting schooling in developing economies where often non-trivial portions
of the population never go to school or dropout very early.
Childhood health investments are modeled along two related dimensions—nutritional
intake and medical care. This is the most common broad division in the health economics
literature and is also convenient for later calibration of public subsidies and relative prices
due to how available cross-country data is aggregated. Formally, composite early health
investments are produced with inputs of food (d) and medical care (m) according to:
i = dχm1−χ, χ ∈ [0, 1] .
As a youth, educational investments are made through a combination of schooling time
(s) and expenditures on educational quality (q) according to:
e = θsηq1−η η ∈ [0, 1] ,
where θ is an idiosyncratic parameter that reflects a youth’s learning ability. Learning ability
is assumed to be correlated from one generation to the next though a simple Markov process.
The choice variable s takes values between zero and one and reflects the fraction of an
individual’s youth that is spent in school. Expenditures on educational quality are assumed
to be a composite of human capital services
(
h˜
)
and educational goods (g):
q = h˜φg1−φ φ ∈ [0, 1] .
This captures the notion that both physical goods (e.g. books, buildings, transport) as well
as human capital—primarily in the form of teachers—are necessary to realize meaningful
returns from dedicating time to school.
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1.3.4 Prices
Markets are assumed competitive and the representative firm in the final good sector chooses
capital stocks to maximize profits. This implies that physical and human capital earn their
marginal products:
w = (1− α)AKαH−α (1.2)
r = AαKα−1H1−α − δ (1.3)
where w is per unit wage rate for human capital, r is the interest rate on physical capital,
and the price of the final good is set to one (the numeraire).
The relative prices of human capital investment goods in terms of the final good (Pf , Pm, Pg)
are exogenously set during calibration. Given the relative price of food Pd and medical care
Pm, the price of composite early health investments can be determined by a household static
cost minimization problem:
Pii = min
d,m
Pdd+ Pmm
s.t. i = dχm1−χ.
Setting χˆ ≡ 1−χ
χ
, the optimal choices are
m =
(
χˆ
Pd
Pm
)χ
i, d =
(
χˆ
Pd
Pm
)χ−1
i.
This implies
Pi =
χˆχ
1− χP
χ
d P
1−χ
m .
Notice that the price of composite early health inputs is increasing in both the price of food
and medical care.
Similarly, given the relative price for inputs h˜ and g, the price of composite investments
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in educational quality can be determined by the static cost minimization problem:
Pqq = min
h˜,g
wh˜+ Pgg
s.t. q = h˜φg1−φ.
Setting φˆ ≡ 1−φ
φ
, the optimal choices are
g =
(
φˆ
w
Pg
)φ
q, h˜ =
(
φˆ
w
Pg
)φ−1
q.
This implies
Pq =
φˆφ
1− φw
φP 1−φg .
The price of composite educational quality inputs is increasing in the price of human capital
services (w) and educational goods (Pg).
1.3.5 Public Subsidies
A theory of education and health investments cannot abstract from the significant role of the
public sector. In order to account for this on the education side, I model public expenditures
as a subsidy to composite units of educational quality q. Specifically, expenditures on edu-
cational quality are subsidized at the rate pq so that private expenditures equal (Pq − pq) q.
Because data used later to calibrate the model is only available for total public spending
on education, the subsidy is assumed to be on the composite input q and not directly on
inputs of human capital services h˜ or educational goods g. This is equivalent to assuming
that public funds are divided optimally between the two inputs. Public education subsidies
are financed with a proportional tax on income τq.
Public expenditures on child health are modeled as a subsidy to child medical care m.
Specifically, child medical care is subsidized at the rate pm so that private expenditures
equal (Pm − pm)m. Public medical care subsides are also financed with a proportional tax
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on income τm , such that the total tax rate is given by: τ = τm+τq. As there is no comparable
cross-country measure of public spending on food subsidization, I do not explicitly include
food subsidies in model. Note, however, that governments in many developing countries
primarily effect food prices on the production side by subsidizing agricultural industries.
Because in my quantitative analysis I adjust Pd across countries based on World Bank data
on observed food prices (see Section 1.4.2), these subsidies would in effect be included in
the adjusted prices. However, this adjustment would not require countries to pay for such
subsidies in the model because they do not show up in the government budget constraint.
Instead, these subsidies effectively show up in the calibrated model as exogenous productivity
gains in the agriculture sector. In short, as long as these agricultural subsides serve as a
relatively small distortion through taxes, this distinction can be safely ignored.
1.3.6 Earnings and Asset Market
As a youth, an individual begins earning income in the labor market after they have com-
pleted school. As such, the total earnings for a youth is given by:
wψh (1− s) ,
where ψ is a life-cycle productivity parameter. As an adult, an individual’s time is fully
dedicated to work and earnings are given by:
w (h+ z) ,
where z is an iid stochastic non-negative productivity shock. The productivity shock provides
an important source of heterogeneity in the model and is unknown and uninsurable prior to
an individual reaching adulthood. The shock is assumed to remain throughout the remainder
18
of an individual’s life resulting in elder earnings given by:
κw (h+ z) ,
where κ is the portion of elderhood that is spent working prior to retirement. Finally,
individuals are able to save or borrow a single risk-free asset (a) which earns the gross after-
tax return R. For ease of future notation, denote the sum of adult and the present value of
elder after-tax earnings as:
W (h, z) = (1− τ)
[
1 +R−1κ
]
w (h+ z) .
1.3.7 Borrowing Constraints
The dynamic nature of child development implies that investments should optimally be
spread out over time in a manner that takes advantage of complementarities. It is well known
that this leaves scope for credit constraints during childhood to inhibit efficient investments
in human capital (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Caucutt and Lochner 2012). Despite this
and the evidence that early health matters for adult outcomes, no research has examined if
borrowing constraints inhibit early health investments. However, there is a growing body of
evidence that suggests the general effects of borrowing constraints may be most important
at young ages.9 By explicitly modeling early childhood separately from schooling ages, my
theory allows credit frictions to interact with investments over the dynamic process of child
development. This implies that borrowing constraints may be an important source of cross-
country schooling differences not only because they directly limit investments in education,
but also because they result in underinvestment in early childhood health which lowers the
returns of later going to school.
9For example, several studies have concluded that family income received early in life has a larger impact
on educational outcomes than income received later in life (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; Duncan et al.
1998; Levy and Duncan 1999; Caucutt and Lochner 2006, 2012). Other studies find highest returns for
disadvantaged children in early childhood programs (Blau and Currie 2006; Cunha et al. 2006).
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As discussed in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011), availability of loans is often explicitly
linked to individual levels of human capital. The basic reasoning is that higher skilled
individuals have higher expected future earnings and are thus able to credibly commit to
repay more debt. This reasoning also implies that economies with stronger mechanisms for
enforcing loan contracts (e.g. wage garnishments or exclusion from financial markets) will
also experience less credit market inefficiencies. To capture these important credit market
features, I employ endogenous borrowing constraints. Specifically, youths are able to borrow
up to a fraction γ of the discounted value of their lowest possible earnings stream. Formally,
this borrowing constraint is given by:
B (h) = γR−1W (h, z)
where z represents the lowest possible productivity shock. The parameter γ thus reflects
the efficiency of credit markets, or alternatively the relevant financial development of the
economy. This may be of particular importance for families in developing economies where
financial markets are often severely underdeveloped, thus limiting access to credit at early
and late stages of life. Importantly, I allow borrowing limits to vary across countries according
to the domestic level of financial development.
1.3.8 Decision Problem
Without loss of generality, the youth is assumed to make all decisions for the household given
three state variables—household wealth (b), health investments made in the youth as a child
(i), and the youth’s learning ability (θ). Given this state vector, a youth maximizes the
present utility of the household plus the expected discounted utility of all future generations
of the family dynasty. Specifically, a youth chooses household consumption c, assets a′, their
own educational investments (s, q) and health investments in their young child i′, who is
conceived towards the end of youth.
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Using dynamic programming language, the decision problem faced by a youth can be
written:
V (b, i, θ) = max
c,s,q,i′,a′
{u (c) + βEz′,θ′ [V (b′, i′, θ′)]}
subject to
c = b+ (1− τ)wψh (1− s)− (Pq − pq) q − Pii′ − a′
b′ = Ra′ +W (h, z′)
h = f (i, s, q, θ) , a′ ≥ −B (h)
s ∈ [0, 1] , c, q, i′ ≥ 0
where u (.) is current period utility and value function V (.) is the total expected discounted
utility of arriving in a period of time with a given state vector. The first constraint is the
household budget constraint equating consumption to household wealth plus youth earnings
less expenditures on human capital and savings. The total cost of educational investments
include subsidized expenditures on educational quality (Pq − pq) q as well as the forgone
earnings from time spent in school. The second constraint defines household wealth the
following period when the youth becomes an adult themselves. This wealth includes the
gross return to household asset holdings as well as the youth’s earnings as an adult.10
Note that any assets borrowed against the youth’s future earnings (i.e. a′ < 0) can be used
on current household consumption c, educational investments in the youth (s, q), or early
health investment in the youth’s child i′. However, due to the endogeneity of the borrowing
constraint, if youths are not investing in their own human capital, their borrowing capability
will be limited. Note also that the value function next period is only known in expectation due
to the stochastic nature of future productivity and ability shocks. This implies that while a
10Adults are not restricted from fully borrowing against their elder earnings so the present value of elder
earnings can simply be included as part of adult earnings. Any earnings of the youth’s parent as an elder
are thus implicitly included in asset holdings a′.
21
youth knows their learning ability prior to making educational investments, they do not know
the productivity shock they will receive as an adult. Furthermore, the youth must make early
health investments in their own child without knowing the child’s learning ability. Recall
that due to the dynamic nature of human capital accumulation, early health investments
are potentially important when choosing later levels of educational quality expenditures and
schooling.
1.3.9 Definition of Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions, decision rules, prices, subsidy
rates and an invariant distribution of households across states, such that (i) given prices,
subsidies, and the tax rate, households solve their optimization problem; (ii) given prices,
firms maximize profits; (iii) physical and human capital markets clear and the aggregate
resource constraint holds; (iv) government budget is balanced. For a detailed definition of
the equilibrium in the model economy, see Appendix A.
1.3.10 Sources of Heterogeneity
Before moving on to the empirical calibration strategy, it is useful to summarize the sources of
heterogeneity in model (see Table 1.2). Differences in family wealth and individual learning
ability drive heterogeneity in human capital investments within a country. However, differ-
ences in the stationary distribution of family wealth and human capital in each economy is
determined by heterogeneity at the country level. In this chapter, I focus on cross-country
differences along three dimensions—prices, public subsidies, and financial development. Price
heterogeneity is driven by productivity differences in the production of final and investment
goods. Productivity remains the most common means of explaining cross-country distri-
butions of national income and other outcomes in the macroeconomic literature. Public
subsidies to early health and education are substantial in most countries of the world and
may help increase or redistribute investments across the household population. Finally, fi-
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nancial development governs how much parents can borrow against future earnings to invest
in themselves or their children. The extent to which financial constraints restrict human
capital investments determines how closely health and education is tied to family wealth
within a country. In the next section I discuss in more detail how each of these features are
calibrated across countries using empirical data.
Table 1.2: Sources of Heterogeneity
Within-Country Cross-Country
Ability θ -
Productivity z -
Prices - w,R, Pd, Pm, Pg
Public subsidies - pm, pq
Financial Development - γ
1.4. CALIBRATION
I use a calibrated version of the model to quantitatively assess the impact of early health
differences on educational outcomes among a cross-section of countries. Due to data avail-
ability, calibration and later counterfactual experiments are conducted on a sample of 71
countries. There is little empirical evidence or theoretical precedence to directly pin down
many parameters in the model. However, I take the stance that certain processes such as
human capital development and the inter-generational transmission of ability are universal in
nature. As such, I take advantage of the availability of rich longitudinal and cross-sectional
data in the U.S. to restrict the parameters governing these processes. Specifically, univer-
sal parameters are calibrated so that the baseline equilibrium of the U.S. model economy
matches a number of relevant moments from the U.S. data. Other parameters that govern
heterogeneity across countries such as prices and public subsidies are calibrated for each
country individually. This section describes these calibrations in turn.
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1.4.1 Parameters Common Across Countries
Parameters governing preferences, production technologies (except TFP), life-cycle produc-
tivity, and random processes are assumed to be common across all countries. For ease of
exposition, I will discuss calibration for each of these groups in turn, but to be clear, all U.S.
data moments were targeted simultaneously in order to pin down common parameters.
1.4.1.1 Preferences and Final Good Production The household utility function is
assumed to be given by:
u (c) = c
1−σ
1− σ
where σ ≥ 0. I set the relative risk aversion parameter σ = 2 while the discount factor β is
set to target an annual after-tax interest rate in the U.S. of 5% (Browning et al. 1999). For
final good production, I set the capital share parameter α = 0.33 which is consistent with
the capital-income share in the U.S. (Gollin 2002). Finally, the annual depreciation rate is
most commonly set in the 5-10% range in the macro literature, as such δ is set to an annual
rate of 7.5%. Table 1.3 gives the set of preference and final good production parameters that
are common across all countries.
Table 1.3: Preferences and Final Good Production Parameters
Parameter Value
CRRA σ 2
Discount factor β 0.28
Capital share α 0.33
Period depreciation δ 1.8
1.4.1.2 Human Capital Production Since my theory is primarily concerned with hu-
man capital investment decisions, it is important to carefully consider how human capital
production parameters are selected. The six parameters governing the production of human
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capital {η, ν, pi, λ, φ, χ} are calibrated to match the following six targets for the U.S.:
1. Average years of schooling of 13.4, computed from CPS data on 30 year olds in 2005.
2. Correlation of schooling attainment to conditional parental earnings from conception
to age six of 0.18. This correlation is calculated after conditioning on parental earnings
from ages 7 to 30. This statistic is computed using data form the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the 1979 parental cohort.11
3. Average annual private expenditures on child health from age 0-5 of 4.5% of per capita
GDP for the middle tercile of parental income. To remain consistent with the model,
this statistic is computed by combining expenditure estimates for food and health care
reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for 2005 (Lino 2006).12
4. High school dropout rate of 0.12, computed from CPS data on 30 year olds in 2005.
5. Teacher and staff compensation share of total educational expenditures of 0.67 for
2005, computed from U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics
(2008).
6. Ratio of annual private food to health care expenditures on children age 0-5 of 0.5,
computed from USDA data for 2005.
Though the parameters interact to affect the targeted moments in complex ways, each pa-
rameter has meaningful effects on specific targets. The teacher salary share of educational
quality inputs φ is directly pinned down by teacher and staff compensation share of total edu-
cational expenditures. Likewise, the ratio of annual private food to health care expenditures
on children aged 0-5 is used to directly pin down the food share of early health investments
11Parental earnings are calculated from reported family income between $200 and $275,000 averaged over
the specified ages of the child. All earnings are adjusted to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U and discounted to
the child’s birth year using a 5% interest rate.
12Does not include health care expenses covered by insurance. However, I use out-of-pocket spending to
set public medical care subsidies. This is equivalent to including employer provided insurance as part of
public expenditures on health which is funded with taxes on income.
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χ. Given the other parameters, average years of schooling sharply increases with the school-
ing time share η while average private health spending on children is increasing in the skill
multiplier pi. Recall that the parameter λ determines how productive a youth can be in the
labor market without making educational investments. As a result, this parameter plays
a primary role in determining the opportunity costs of attending school during the early
ages of youth. As the youth continues to attend school, the importance of this parameter
diminishes quickly. As such, the high school dropout rate is quite sensitive to increases in λ.
Finally, the complementarity between early health and later educational investments
ν targets the conditional correlation of schooling attainment to annual parental earnings
from conception to age six. Identification of this parameter relies on the fact that some
children receive fewer health investments because their parents are financially constrained,
but the family receives a high income shock when the child becomes a youth. The degree
of complementarity will limit how much such youths will invest in education relative to a
youth of equal wealth and ability but more early health investments.
Table 1.4 shows the calibrated parameters and a comparison between the data targets
and the simulated moments from the U.S. benchmark economy. The calibration matches
the targeted moments very well. Notice that the calibration results in strong dynamic
complementarity of investments: ν = −1.3 implies an elasticity of substitution between
health and education investments of 0.43. Although there is no direct empirical comparison
for this measure, it is quite similar to the elasticity estimates over childhood reported by
Cunha et al. (2010) and Caucutt and Lochner (2012).
1.4.1.3 Life-cycle and Random Processes Recall that within country heterogeneity
comes from idiosyncratic learning ability and productivity shocks. For households in all
countries, ability is assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs:
ln (θ′) = ρ ln (θ) + θ, θ ∼ N
(
0, σ2θ
)
.
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Table 1.4: Human Capital Production Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data B.E.
School time share η 0.46 Mean years of schooling 13.4 13.4
Complementarity ν -1.3 Corr of schooling to parent earnings (age 0-6) 0.18 0.18
Skill multiplier pi 0.05 Private health expend. (age 0-5–% GDP p.c.) 4.5 4.5
Base producivity λ 0.16 High school dropout rate 0.12 0.12
Teacher share φ 0.60 Salary share of educational expenditures 0.67 0.67
Food share χ 0.67 Food to health care expend. ratio (age 0-5) 0.5 0.5
I approximate this process over seven discrete values for ability using the Tauchen (1986)
method. Productivity shocks are assumed to be iid log normal:
ln (z) ∼ N
(
µz, σ
2
z
)
,
and are similarly approximated over ten discrete values.
In addition to parameters governing the random processes, there are two remaining life-
cycle parameters — ψ which governs youth productivity, and κ which adjusts elder earnings
for retirement. The retirement parameter κ is set to a retirement age of 65. The five
remaining parameters {ψ, µz, σz, σθ, ρ} are calibrated to match the following five targets for
the U.S.:
1. College graduation rate of 0.32, computed from CPS data on 30 year olds in 2005.
2. Average adult earnings to GDP per capita ratio of 1.4, computed from CPS data in
2005.13
3. Standard deviation of log of permanent earnings of 0.7 (Kopczuk et al. 2010).
4. Standard deviation of schooling of 2.9, computed from CPS data on 30 year olds in
2005.
5. Inter-generational correlation of schooling of 0.46 (Hertz et al. 2007).
13Earnings calculated using full-time year-round male workers aged 31-54 and are discounted to age 42
using a 5% interest rate.
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While λ plays an important role in dropout decisions during early years of schooling, youth
productivity ψ has a more pronounced effect at the top end of the schooling distribution.
As such, this parameter effectively targets the college graduation rate. The mean and stan-
dard deviation parameters for the productivity shock (µz, σz) target the mean and standard
deviation of earnings of adults. Finally, given the other parameters, the standard deviation
and persistence of the ability shock (σθ, ρ) have strong effects on the standard deviation and
intergenerational correlation of schooling. Table 1.5 shows the calibrated parameters and
a comparison between the data targets and the simulated moments from the benchmark
economy. Again, the calibration matches the targeted moments quite well.
Table 1.5: Life-cycle and Random Processes Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data B.E.
Youth productivity ψ 0.24 College graduation rate 0.32 0.35
Retirement share κ 0.42 Retirement age 65 65
Productivity shock log-mean µz -4.1 Mean earnings to GDP p.c. 1.4 1.4
Productivity shock std σz 2.0 Std of log earnings 0.7 0.7
Ability std σθ 0.43 Std of schooling 2.9 2.9
Ability persistence ρ 0.44 Correlation of schooling 0.46 0.40
1.4.2 Country-specific Parameters
In addition to the universal parameters that are assumed to be common in all economies, a
number of parameters are assumed to vary across countries. These country-specific parame-
ters include prices, public subsidies to education and medical care, and financial development.
1.4.2.1 Prices Wages and interest rates are allowed to vary across countries not only due
to differing levels of capital investments, but also due to differences in TFP. I allow for this
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by rewriting equations (1.2) and (1.3) and calculating prices in the baseline economies as:
w = (1− α) ydata
h¯
r = αydata
k¯
− δ
where ydata is PPP adjusted GDP per capita from the PennWorld Tables averaged from 2001-
2005, and h¯ and k¯ are the endogenous per capita stocks of human and physical capital.14
Essentially, final output is fixed to observed levels in the data and TFP is adjusted to
ensure the aggregate resource constraint clears in equilibrium. Note that after the baseline
stationary equilibrium is computed for any country, that country’s TFP can be backed out
by rewriting equation (1.1) :
A = Y K−αHα−1.
This yields the TFP value that is fixed in later experiments, where new output levels are
endogenously determined after a counterfactual change.
In the U.S., the relative prices of human capital investment goods in terms of the final
good are normalized to one —PUSf = PUSm = PUSg = 1. I further assume that the local cost of
teachers (i.e. the endogenous wage rate) determines the cross-country difference in the price
of composite educational quality inputs Pq, by setting the the relative price of educational
goods to one for all countries (Pg = 1). However, for each country I adjust the prices of health
inputs directly to account for relative productivity differences in the food and medical care
sectors. Specifically, I use data from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program
(ICP) to adjust the relative price of health inputs (Pd, Pm) using the local price of food and
medical services relative to GDP reported for 2005.
14In theory, output of the final good y should be calibrated using GDP data net of teacher services valued
at international prices and h¯ should be per capita human capital net of teacher services h˜. However, since
these values are relatively small and to avoid a number of issues surrounding the appropriate choice of an
international wage of teachers (see Erosa et al. 2010 for a discussion), I abstract from these adjustments.
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1.4.2.2 Public Subsidies The subsidy rate to early medical care expenditures pm, is
set to match out-of-pocket health care spending as a share of total health care spending
reported by the World Bank.15 For example, the U.S. out-of-pocket cost is reported as 14%
so the subsidy rate in the U.S. is set to pUSm = 0.86PUSm . There is substantial variation in
out-of-pocket health care rates across countries, with many developing countries realizing
significantly higher rates than richer countries (see Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3: Health Care Costs. Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
While health subsidies are directly pinned down by the data, baseline education subsidies
are calibrated for each country during computation of the stationary equilibrium. Specifi-
cally, education subsidies pq are set to target data on total public expenditures on education
as a percentage of GDP from the Word Bank (see Figure 1.4). In a set of policy experi-
ments, I later consider the implications of adjusting health versus educational subsidies in
the developing world.
15Out-of-pocket spending is most consistent with the USDA data of early health spending used in the U.S.
calibration, which does not include expenses paid by insurance.
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Figure 1.4: Public Spending on Education. Source: World Development Indicators, The
World Bank.
1.4.2.3 Financial Development As there is no direct measure of the efficiency of credit
markets as modeled in my theory, I use a slightly modified strategy to vary the financial
development parameter γ across countries. First, I calibrate the parameter for the U.S.—
again using a data moment to restrict the value. Second, I use a common financial proxy to
adjust the parameter across countries. I briefly describe these two steps in turn.
Without credit frictions in my model, earnings would only be correlated across genera-
tions due to any persistence of learning ability. Thus, holding persistence and other parame-
ters constant, the correlation of earnings is negatively related to financial development—given
that at least some individuals face binding constraints. As such, I calibrate γUS by targeting
an inter-generational correlation of log-earnings of 0.44 as reported in Lee and Solon (2009).
Restricting the financial development parameter in the U.S. to match the moment results
in a calibrated value of γUS = 0.3, implying that youths in the U.S. are able to borrow a
maximum of 30% of the present value of their lowest possible adult earnings.
After calibrating γUS for the benchmark economy, I use World Bank data on domestic
credit to the private sector to proxy each countries relative level of financial development.
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Formally, for any country j, the financial development parameter is calculated as:
γj =
FDj
FDUS
× γUS
where FD is the domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP averaged
from 2001-2005. In this way, I simply scale the financial development parameter of the
U.S. economy by the relative domestic credit in each country. There is substantial variation
across countries when using this measure of development (see Figure 1.5). I view this as a
simple yet meaningful way to capture important heterogeneity across countries along this
dimension.
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Figure 1.5: Financial Development. Source: World Development Indicators, The World
Bank.
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1.5. BASELINE RESULTS
This section begins by assessing the ability of the model to predict the cross-country disper-
sions of schooling attainment and schooling Gini coefficients observed in the data. Additional
features of the baseline economies are then detailed. Throughout the quantitative analysis,
I define developing countries as those with PPP adjusted GDP per capital under $10,000.16
1.5.1 Fit of the Model
After computing the baseline equilibrium for the full set of 71 countries in the sample, I
assess the fit of the calibrated model to observed schooling inequality within and across
countries. The schooling attainment and schooling Gini coefficients from the data and the
model are presented in Figures 1.6 and 1.7, while Table 1.6 displays a number of summary
measures that are useful in assessing the overall performance of model. While calibrated to
match schooling outcomes for the U.S. only, the model does quite well in predicting average
attainment and inequality across the set of sample countries. The predicted cross-country
mean of average schooling attainment is 10.5 in the model and 9.6 in the data while the
predicted cross-country mean of the schooling Gini is 0.19 in model and 0.18 in the data.
Table 1.6: Model’s Performance
Measure Cross-Country Mean Corr. Cross-Country S.D.
Data Model Data Model
Ave Years of Schooling 9.6 10.5 0.87 2.76 2.69
Schooling Gini 0.18 0.19 0.73 0.14 0.10
Although cross-country standard deviations were not targeted in calibration, the model
also does well in predicting the dispersion of schooling measures across countries. Specifically,
the model predicts 97% of the standard deviation of average attainment and 71% of the
16This is roughly consistent with the World Bank definition of developing countries in 2005. Out of the
71 sample countries, 33 fall in this category.
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Figure 1.7: Schooling Gini Coefficients
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dispersion of the schooling Gini. Furthermore, the correlation between schooling attainment
in the model and the data is quite high at 0.87. The correlation is slightly lower for the
schooling Gini at 0.73 as the model somewhat over-predicts the coefficient for high-income
countries, where inequality is relatively low.17 Overall however, the model does quite well
in explaining the patterns of schooling attainment and inequality observed across sample
countries.
1.5.2 Additional Features of the Baseline Economies
The model predicts that human capital varies significantly more across countries than school-
ing attainment levels (see Figure 1.8). For example, the average human capital among de-
veloping countries is only 36% that of U.S. while schooling attainment is 61%. This suggest
that standard human capital estimates based only on years of schooling would under-estimate
differences between the U.S. and the developing world by almost 60%. The increased dis-
persion in human capital over schooling estimates is driven by differences in early childhood
health and later educational quality investments—average investments in the developing
world amount to only 18% and 16% of U.S. levels, respectively (see Figure 1.9).
In order to examine the mechanism linking early health to education it is also useful to
examine how within-country inequality differs across countries. As national income rises,
early health inequality falls sharply among the very poorest countries in the sample before
leveling off and then slowly rising among high-income countries (see Figure 1.10).18 This
pattern is consistent with very high returns up to some minimal amount of early health
investment, at which point returns to additional investments are only achieved by accompa-
17Note however that comparing schooling Ginis from the model and data is non-trivial. While model
calculations are based on a known continuous schooling variable for each individual, empirical schooling
Ginis are calculated from aggregate estimates of discrete data. For example, empirical estimates use the
fraction of individuals who reach certain discrete cut-points (e.g. the percentage who complete primary
school) and estimates of average attainment at each discrete level (e.g. average years of primary schooling).
Furthermore, the specific cut-points used in estimation vary from country to country (e.g. primary school
ends at grade 6 or 8).
18For consistency with the measurement of schooling inequality, health inequality is also measured through
a Gini coefficient.
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nying them with substantial educational quality inputs. When examining the relationship
between early health inequality and later educational inequality, several relationships emerge.
First, educational investment Ginis are significantly higher than early health Ginis across all
countries in the sample (see Figure 1.11). Second, there is positive correlation between the
two measures, predicting that countries with more early health inequality also experience
more inequality in later educational investments. These observations are consistent with
early health inequalities being amplified into even larger gaps in educational investments in
the model. In the next section, I attempt to quantify this amplification mechanism using a
number of counterfactual experiments.
Finally, there is substantial variation in the percentage of households in each country
that borrow up to their limits in the baseline (see Figure 1.12). In the U.S., 14% of families
are financially constrained compared to an average of 41% among developing countries.
These measures are consistent with lower levels of financial development and human capital
among developing countries—recall borrowing constraints are endogenously determined by
an individual’s ability to repay.
In the U.S., it is relatively poor youths that receive a high ability shock that are borrow-
ing constrained. Since all children in the U.S. receive a relatively substantial early health
investment, even the poor youths have enough invested in their early health to make it
worthwhile to borrow to take advantage of their high learning ability. All else equal, high
ability parents also invest somewhat more in the health of their child than lower ability par-
ents due to complementarities and the persistence of ability across generations. As a result,
even though constrained youths choose marginally lower health investments in their children
than unconstrained youths of similar ability, overall they actually invest 3% more than the
average unconstrained parent. Compare this to the developing world where constrained par-
ents invest about 23% less in their child’s health than unconstrained parents. Here it is poor
youths with little invested in their early health that would like to borrow over their limits
in order to finance additional consumption as well as investments in their child’s health.
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Figure 1.11: Early Health and Education Inequality
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Figure 1.12: Financially Constrained
In other words—while credit frictions predominately limit educational investments made by
some high ability youths in the U.S., in the developing world they also substantially limit
early health investments of poor parents. These features of the baseline economies highlight
the differing effects of credit fictions in determining human capital investments over alternate
stages of child development.
1.6. COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section I discuss a number of counterfactual experiments conducted on the same
sample of 71 countries used in the baseline analysis. First I attempt to isolate and quan-
titatively assess the effects of early health inequalities on education and other outcomes. I
do this by eliminating early health differences within each country, then across all countries.
Lastly, I discuss a set of experiments that compare the effects of increasing early health
versus educational subsidies in terms of efficiency and equity of investments.
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1.6.1 Equating Early Health Within Countries
The strong complementarity between early health and educational investments identified in
the baseline calibration suggests that early health inequalities play a potentially significant
role in determining later educational inequalities. In order to quantitatively assess this
mechanism, I simulate a counterfactual set of economies in which early health inequalities are
eliminated. Specifically, in this experiment I equate i to the maximum baseline level within
each country. In other words, for each country I fix early health investments for all children
to the highest level that was realized by any child in that country in the baseline. I then allow
taxes to adjust in order to pay for the policy change (while keeping the percentage of output
devoted to public education τq at the baseline level). In practice, this is equivalent to a
policy of universal food and medical care for young children at a fixed level where additional
investments are not possible. Average percentage change from the baseline economies across
the full sample and for the subset of developing countries are reported in Table 1.7 for
selected outcomes.
Table 1.7: Equating Health Within Countries (Ave % Change)
Countries School log y Consumption % Constrained
Ave Gini Ave Gini
All 17.6 -4.7 1.8 4.4 -9.6 -0.6
Developing 27.6 -12.0 2.0 0.2 -11.7 -9.8
Raising investments to eliminate early health differences within countries reduces school-
ing Ginis by 4.7% and increases average schooling attainment by 17.6% on average across
all countries. When focusing only on developing countries, these changes are significantly
stronger—schooling Ginis fell by 12% and schooling attainment rose by 27.6% on average.
These results occur because the increase in early health raises the productivity of later educa-
tional investments due to complementarities, particularly for the children of poor, financially
constrained parents. This effect is then compounded over time as poor but healthier children
ultimately realize higher earnings as adults and are able to transfer more resources to their
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child who can then invest more in their own education. This quantitatively demonstrates my
first main finding—early health inequalities in developing counties are amplified into larger
schooling inequalities. This amplification effect is much smaller in higher income countries
where fewer parents are constrained and most children are healthy enough in the baseline
to realize gains from attending school for a significant length of time. In these countries,
further increases in early health levels are accompanied by smaller changes in schooling due
to the decreasing returns and increasing opportunity costs of attending school as well as
more youths reaching their borrowing limit (see discussion below).
In addition to schooling attainment, output also rose on average as a result of the exper-
iment. Despite this, consumption remained unchanged on average in developing countries
where increased national income was used mostly to finance the new health policy as well
as increased spending on eduction. However, consumption inequality between households—
measured through a consumption Gini—fell by almost 12%. Thus, although there was no
level effect on consumption in developing economies, there was a redistributive effect.
The experiment also results in two opposing effects on the borrowing choices of families.
First, because health is fixed for all children, poor youths do not need to borrow to make early
heath investments; in addition, the redistributive effect of the policy allows them to borrow
less for consumption purposes. Second, due to the complementarity of investments, the
increase in early heath level increases the productivity of later educational investments. This
pushes poor youths to borrow additional funds to invest in their eduction—particularly those
with high learning ability. Among developing countries, the first effect dominates the second,
resulting in nearly a 10% reduction in the fraction of families that are financially constrained.
However, in the developed world the second effect dominates resulting in over a 7% increase
in constrained families. These results are consistent with the previous discussion on features
of the baseline economies. Specifically, families in higher income countries primarily borrow
funds to finance education while those in developing countries also borrow for consumption
and early health investments.
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My second main finding is that early health gaps are an important source of schooling
variation across countries. Raising to equate early health within countries results in a 19.2%
reduction in the cross-country standard deviation of schooling (see Table 1.8). Schooling
inequality within countries also looks more similar across countries—the cross-country stan-
dard deviation of schooling Ginis falls by 36.8%. This further highlights that early health
inequalities have differing effects on schooling gaps across national income levels. However,
equating early health within countries with a tax and transfer scheme has little effect on the
world log-income distribution. In my next experiment, I compare how these results differ
when exogenously equating early health worldwide to the average U.S. level.
Table 1.8: Equating Health Within Countries
Cross-Country S.D. % Change
Ave sch log y sch Gini
-19.2 0.0 -36.8
1.6.2 Equating Early Health Across Countries
The primary purpose of this experiment is to quantitatively assess how cross-country differ-
ences in early health levels affect the world dispersion of schooling attainment. To this end,
I equate early health investments i to the average baseline level of the U.S. for all individuals
in all countries. As opposed to the previous experiment, I leave tax rates at their baseline
level for all countries, as much of the developing world would not be able to internally fund
such a large change in early health investments. The main results of the experiment are
reported in Table 1.9 and illustrated in Figure 1.13.
Table 1.9: Equating Health Across Countries
Cross-Country S.D. % Change
Ave sch log y sch Gini
-53.4 -12.7 -40.2
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43
As a result of the experiment, the cross-country standard deviation of schooling falls by
53.4%, suggesting that early health differences across countries are an important source of
observed schooling attainment gaps. Early health inequalities also play a relatively significant
role in determining the world income distribution—the standard deviation of log-output falls
nearly 13%. The cross-country standard deviation of schooling Ginis falls by 40%, which is
only slightly larger than the previous experiment equating early health levels within but not
across countries. This occurs because schooling Ginis fall considerably more for the highest
income countries relative to the first experiment. Equating early health to the average U.S.
level for everyone results in lower levels of early health for many wealthy, high-ability youths
in high income countries. Due to complementarities, these youths choose to reduce schooling
nearly as much as poor or lower-ability youths increase schooling. This decreases schooling
Ginis in the richest countries but has little effect on average attainment levels.
The average within country effects of the experiment are shown in Table 1.10. Average
schooling levels in developing countries increase by nearly 50% while the average schooling
Gini falls by 18.9%. Notice that once again output rises and consumption inequality within
countries falls as a result of equating health among children. However, since this experiment
no longer requires countries to fund the increase in early health investments with higher
taxes, the increase in output is accompanied by a large increase in consumption, especially
among developing countries. Finally, note that developing countries again experience an
average decrease in the fraction of families constrained due to the level and redistributive
effects of the experiment.
Table 1.10: Equating Health Across Countries (Ave % Change)
Countries School log y Consumption % Constrained
Ave Gini Ave Gini
All 26.1 -14.4 2.9 28.7 -12.3 -4.6
Developing 48.2 -18.9 5.0 48.0 -15.7 -12.0
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1.6.3 Education and Early Health Subsidies
I next discuss two alternate policy experiments to compare the effects of an increase in early
health subsidies versus a roughly cost-equivalent increase in later education subsidies. Specif-
ically, I increase the annual tax rate the equivalent of $30 per youth ($90 per child) based on
baseline output levels and increase either early health or education subsidies accordingly. For
example, if a country’s baseline annual output was valued at $3,000 per youth, I increase the
tax rate by 1% and devote these additional public funds to either early health or education
subsidization.
Recall that due to data availability issues on food subsidies, explicit public health spend-
ing in the baseline was restricted to only medical care subsidies pm. However, for the early
health subsidy experiment, I keep medical care subsidies fixed at baseline levels and assume
that the additional public funds are used to subsidize composite early health investments i
at the rate pi. This is equivalent to assuming that the government divides the new funds
optimally between food and medical care subsidies. I denote the tax rate designated for
the composite health subsidy τi. Note that it is the tax rates (τi, τq) that are exongenously
adjusted in these experiments, while the actual subsidy rates (pi, pq) are determined endoge-
nously by ensuring that the government budget is balanced in the new stationary equilibrium.
As detailed below, the tax increase of $30 per youth has a substantial impact among devel-
oping countries. However, this dollar amount represents a very minimal increase in public
funding among richer countries and effects are very mild. As such, I restrict my reporting
and discussion of the policy effects to developing countries. Results of both experiments for
these countries are summarized in Table 1.11.
Table 1.11: Increasing Subsidies in Developing Countries (Ave % Change)
Experiment i s q log y c %
Ave Gini Ave Gini Ave Gini Gini Constrained
Increase τi 53.1 -5.5 16.0 -9.3 20.2 -3.9 1.4 -4.6 -7.4
Increase τq 3.5 0.2 6.4 -10.4 32.0 -5.6 0.4 -0.5 0.2
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Devoting the additional public funds towards early childhood health raises average in-
vestments i by 53% and reduces the corresponding Gini by 5.5%. Due to dynamic comple-
mentarity, increasing early investments also results in substantial increases of human capital
investments in later stages of child development. Specifically, there is a 16% increase in
average years of schooling and a 20% increase in average educational quality investments.
Furthermore, the inequality of investments is reduced along each of these dimensions. All
together the policy change results in a 1.4% average increase in log-output, a 4.6% average
decrease in consumption inequality, and an average of 7.4% fewer constrained families.
When the increased public funding goes directly to education, there is a substantial 32%
average increase in educational quality investments accompanied by a 6.4% average increase
in schooling. Inequality along these two dimensions falls a similar magnitude as the previous
experiment. However, early health investments increase a much lower 3.5% and the early
health Gini rises a very small 0.2% on average. Intuitively, it is the wealthier unconstrained
parents who are able to increase their early health investments to fully take advantage of
the anticipated benefit of the more generous education subsidy when their child becomes a
youth the next period. Conversely, while poor constrained families invest more in educational
quality because it is cheaper, they are unable to adjust earlier investments in health to fully
take advantage of complementarities. As a result, output rises and consumption inequality
falls to a much lesser extent than when new public funds are spent on early childhood
health. This implies there is no equity-efficiency trade-off between the two alternate policy
options. Increasing subsidies to early health results in more output and less inequality than
a cost-equivalent increase in educational subsidies.
The main policy conclusion drawn from these experiments is that the effects of early
health interventions tend to be amplified by later educational choices. At the same time,
interventions that target school-aged children may be limited if early health conditions are
not taken into account. This is not to conclude that the reduction of public education
funding in favor of health spending is a mechanism to improve child outcomes. Rather, an
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alternate policy perspective is that the effects of pubic education in the developing world
could be most effectively amplified if combined with additional early health interventions.
1.7. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I developed a theory of human capital accumulation to quantitatively assess
the importance of early childhood health in determining later educational investments. After
restricting the parameters governing the production of human capital with data from the
U.S., I use the theory to examine what drives the observed variation of schooling attainment
across countries. The calibrated model finds strong complementarity between early childhood
health investments and later educational investments. As a result, early childhood health
inequalities are amplified into large schooling differences both within and across countries.
Quantitatively, I find that raising early health investments to equalize levels within coun-
tries lowers schooling Gini coefficients an average of 12% in developing economies but has
very mild effects in richer countries. The experiment also results in over a 19% reduction in
the cross-country standard deviation of average schooling attainment. Furthermore, when
early health is equalized worldwide to the average U.S. level, the cross-country dispersion
of schooling falls over 53% relative to the baseline. This quantitatively demonstrates the
importance of early health differences in explaining the large and persistent schooling gaps
observed across countries.
Due to the dynamic complementarity of investments, I also find that the timing of policy
intervention has important implications for human capital accumulation over childhood. In
counterfactual experiments I find that increasing subsidies to early childhood health has
substantially larger effects on investment decisions than later subsidies to education. These
findings reinforce the notion of child health policy as an effective educational policy tool.
Finally, my model is able to reproduce the cross-country dispersion of schooling attain-
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ment and inequality quite well by incorporating cross-country heterogeneity in public health
and education subsidies, prices, and financial development. Public expenditures help alle-
viate underinvestment by the poor while financial development governs the extent to which
parents can borrow against future earnings to invest in themselves or their children. Clearly
other factors affect schooling differences across countries, but I abstract from these in my
current research to focus on the above channels. In future work, I plan to extend my analysis
along multiple dimensions to explore how cross-country differences in fertility, life expectancy,
and child mortality rates interact with dynamic health and educational investment decisions.
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2. THE NONCOGNITIVE RETURNS TO PRIVATE
SCHOOLING IN INDIA: EVIDENCE ON
SELF-EFFICACY AND SELF-ESTEEM1
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Research from a variety of disciplines has shown that school context and the development of
noncognitive traits (or psychosocial competencies) are theoretically and empirically related.
While evidence suggests that school environment directly influences noncognitive develop-
ment, the magnitude and underlying causal mechanisms of the relationship remain an active
area of research. Predominately, existing work has been focused on children transition-
ing through adolescence in economically advanced countries (e.g. Usher and Pajares 2008;
Morin et al. 2013). However, recent economic research finds that educational investments
made during earlier stages of the life-cycle may be particularly influential in the development
process (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Cunha et al. 2010). Moreover, substantial diversities in
school environments have been documented in developing countries such as India (e.g. Galab
et al. 2013; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2015). As such, this chapter contributes to the
1The data used in this chapter come from Young Lives, a 15-year study of the changing nature of childhood
poverty in Ethiopia, India (Andhra Pradesh), Peru and Vietnam (www.younglives.org.uk). Young Lives is
core-funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development (DFID) and co-funded from
2010 to 2014 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed here are those of the
author. They are not necessarily those of Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID or other funders.
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literature by examining the effect of school context on the early development of psychosocial
competencies in a less advanced economy. Specifically, I explore the impact of attending
private school in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh on age eight measures of self-efficacy
and self-esteem. By exploring the effect of private schools on early psychosocial competen-
cies, this chapter begins to uncover which features of educational context may (or may not)
be most important for the development of noncognitive traits in India and in the broader
developing world.
Private school enrollment in India has substantially grown over the past several decades—
estimated enrollments are now over 28% in rural areas and 65% in urban (Pratham 2013;
Rangaraju et al. 2012). With the passing of the Right to Eduction Act in 2009, this trend is
likely to continue.2 At the same time, there is growing evidence that there are positive but
relatively modest cognitive returns to private schooling in India (French and Kingdon 2010;
Singh 2013; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2015). The revealed preference for private
schooling combined with the evidence on cognitive returns suggests that there is scope for
possible gains along noncognitive dimensions. Moreover, Indian data from the Young Lives
Study (YLS) reveals that eight year olds enrolled in private school score significantly higher
than their public school counterparts on measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem—two related
but distinct facets of individual personality (see Section 2.4.1). However, these gaps show
only an overall correlation between private school and noncognitive traits. My aim in this
chapter is to explore the causal effects of private school on these psychosocial competencies,
and how they may vary across different populations of children.
The effects of interest are estimated using a semiparametric structural model of private
school choice where selection occurs based on observable child and family characteristics as
well as unobserved factors. Specifically, I model unobserved factors as child endowments of
cognitive skill, health, and social skill. While well accepted in epidemiology, only recently
have economists began to explore the notion that life outcomes are influenced by the interplay
2The law makes primary education a fundamental right and requires private schools to reserve 25% of
capacity for enrollment of disadvantaged populations.
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of cognitive, physical, and social and emotional traits—a concept referred to as developmental
health (Conti et al. 2011). I follow the work of Carneiro et al. (2003) and Hansen et al. (2004)
by using Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to simulate the parameters
of the model.
I estimate the average treatment effect of attending private school between age five and
eight as an increase in self-efficacy and self-esteem measures of 0.15 and 0.28 standard de-
viations, respectively. These results are within the range of credible estimates of effects on
cognitive outcomes in India, suggesting that private school may play at least as significant a
role in early psychosocial as in cognitive development. My estimation strategy also allows for
the identification of the distribution of treatment effects across family and child characteris-
tics. Understanding which children may or may not benefit from attending private school is
important to help policymakers target interventions in the most efficient manner and may
also shed further light on the underlying mechanisms at work. I find that effects differ by
observable characteristics such as gender, urbanization, caste, household wealth, and ma-
ternal measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem. I also find that effects may differ between
children who are similar in their observed characteristics based on unobserved differences in
cognitive skill, health, and social skill.
In addition to contributing to the literature relating school environment to psychosocial
development, this chapter also adds to the research on the returns to private schooling in
developing economies. Although to my knowledge no other research examines the effects
of private school on noncognitive traits, studies in developing countries have found mixed
evidence on the effect of private schooling on cognitive outcomes (e.g. Angrist et al. 2002;
Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; Newhouse and Beegle 2006; Bold et al. 2013). Within India,
several have found moderate positive effects (French and Kingdon 2010; Singh 2013). In the
most rigorous Indian study, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) evaluate the effects of
a randomized offer of private school vouchers. Coincidentally, the experiment takes place
in the same state and for the same age cohort as the YLS data used in this chapter. The
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authors find no effect of private school on math and Telugu (the native language) but positive
effects on English, Science, Social Studies, and Hindi. The estimated combined effect across
test subjects is similar in magnitude to those found on self-efficacy and self-esteem in this
chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows: in Section 2.2, I discuss related
literature on psychosocial development and the state of private schooling in India. In Sec-
tion 2.3, I develop the structural model of school choice and discuss the identification and
estimation strategy. Section 2.4 discusses the data, while Section 2.5 describes simulation
algorithms and empirical results. In Section 2.6, I present the results of a counterfactual
analysis related to the Rights to Education Act of 2009. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. SELF-EFFICACY, SELF-ESTEEM, AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLING IN INDIA
In recent years, economists have paid increasing attention to the importance of noncognitive
skills on a variety of economic and behavioral outcomes.3 In this chapter, I focus on the
effects of private school attendance in India on composite measures of self-efficacy and self-
esteem—two related but distinct facets of individual personality that have been extensively
studied in the field of psychology. Self-efficacy relates closely to the psychological concept of
locus of control, or sense of agency or mastery over one’s own life. Individuals with a high
level of self-efficacy maintain a strong belief that outcomes are a result of their own efforts,
as opposed the action of others, fate, or random luck. Many studies have found self-efficacy
(or an internal locus of control) to have positive effects on behavioral outcomes such as
educational attainment or subjective belief of the probability of finding a job (e.g. Coleman
3For an overview of related literature and the interface between personality psychology and economics,
see Borghans et al. (2008).
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and DeLeire 2003; Caliendo et al. 2010). The results on wages and other labor outcomes are
more mixed but still find generally positive effects (e.g. Andrisani 1981; Heineck and Anger
2010; Piatek and Pinger 2010). In contrast to self-efficacy, self-esteem reflects an individual’s
overall sense of self-worth. In the psychology literature, self-esteem has been shown to have
strong correlations with a variety of outcomes both in and out of the labor market (e.g.
wages, health, life satisfaction, education). While evidence of causality is heavily debated
for many labor market and health outcomes, there is stronger support that self-esteem leads
to greater happiness (Baumeister et al. 2003; Trzesniewski et al. 2006).
There is increasing evidence that schooling is related to the development of noncognitive
traits in general. For example, researchers have found that schooling attainment affects adult
outcomes believed to be heavily influenced by psychosocial competencies such as health and
health behaviors, criminal activity, teen fertility, political engagement, and life satisfaction
(e.g. Emler and Frazer 1999; Conti et al. 2011; Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011). Recent
theoretic and empirical work by James Heckman and coauthors suggests that human capital
investments such as schooling contribute to the evolution of both cognitive and noncognitive
skills by building off of existing abilities and personality (Heckman 2006; Cunha and Heckman
2007; Cunha et al. 2010). These papers also find evidence that child development is more
sensitive in the early stages of the life-cycle and document the substantial impact of many
early childhood interventions on behavioral outcomes.
While economists have established an important relationship between schooling and
noncognitive skill development, the psychology literature provides several theories of the
underlying mechanisms at work. A prominent example is the work of Albert Bandura (1986;
1997), who hypothesized that children interpret information from four sources which con-
tribute to the evolution of self-efficacy: mastery experience (e.g. successful completion of a
task), vicarious experience (e.g. social models or comparison to others), verbal and social
persuasion (e.g. parent or teacher encouragement), and emotional and physiological states
(e.g. anxiety, fatigue, mood). While mastery experience is considered the most influential
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source of self-efficacy, vicarious experience is believed to play a more prominent role when
transitioning into adolescence (e.g. from elementary to middle school) as children become
more attune to peer group comparisons. In contrast, it is believed that verbal and social
persuasion plays a more prominent role during the earlier formative years when children are
more attentive to messages received from mentor figures such as parents and teachers. Re-
search also suggests that it may be easier to undermine a child’s self-efficacy through social
persuasion than to increase it (e.g. through negative teacher feedback). A wealth of related
research shows that school context may play a role in the early development of self-efficacy,
for example, through facilitating the successful completion of tasks as well as verbal and
social persuasion of teachers or other staff.4
The development of self-esteem has also been shown to have a strong relationship with
school context. While few studies have focused exclusively on the early development of
self-esteem, many have examined the effect of school environment on adolescent self-esteem.
For example, studies have found school climates that promote fairness, security, student
autonomy and participation, and positive interpersonal relationships with teachers and peers
have a positive association with self-esteem (Hoge et al. 1990; Hirsch and DuBois 1991; Deihl
et al. 1997; Roeser and Eccles 1998; Reddy et al. 2003; Greene and Way 2005; Way et al.
2007; Morin et al. 2013). Student’s academic achievement as well as perception that the
school climate promotes mastery and achievement are also related to self-esteem (Hoge et al.
1990; Hirsch and DuBois 1991; Zimmerman et al. 1997; Roeser and Eccles 1998; Morin et al.
2013).
Drawing on the psychology literature on psychosocial development, private schools in
India could conceivably influence self-efficacy and/or self-esteem through an increase in aca-
demic achievement. As several studies have found positive (albeit moderate) effects of private
school on a number cognitive outcomes, this seems at least one plausible channel of influence
(French and Kingdon 2010; Singh 2013; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2015). However,
4For a comprehensive review of the evidence linking school context to self-efficacy, see Usher and Pajares
(2008)
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private schools could be influencing psychosocial competencies through other channels as
well. Private and government-run schools in India are different along many observed (and
likely unobserved) dimensions that could conceivably influence noncognitive development.
For example, quantitative data show that private schools experience lower teacher absence,
better infrastructure, better school hygiene, longer school days, and longer school years
(Galab et al. 2013; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2015).
Qualitative YLS data on parent perceptions of school environment further supports the
possibility that private school directly influences noncognitive development.5 For example,
one parent sending children to private school claimed to have “observed a change in their
attitudes, they are now more responsible towards their homework and they are using cul-
tured language.” Other parents perceived private schools to have a higher overall quality of
instruction, including teachers giving more individual attention and care:
In [a] government school, the teaching imparted is below standards. . . they
don’t pay individual attention and classes are so irregular and lessons are not
taught properly. . . whereas in private schools teaching is good and teachers are
taking individual care [for] each and every student.
Perceived lack of quality in government-run schools is also driven by higher rates of teacher
absence: “in government schools, teaching one day. . . take 10 days break. . . they don’t take
any care at all. . . but in private schools we pay and they take much care”. Other parents
noted teacher punctuality and efforts to connect with parents as major drivers of private
school enrollment:
I observed that teachers in public schools are coming [to class] very late. . .
they don’t bother even if [a] child [is] absent for [a] number of days. . . in private
school, where my two children are studying, teachers are on time to class and if
any child [is] absent for a day they will inquire with parents. . . such concern is
important for us.
5Source of translated qualitative data: Kumar 2013.
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All of these actual or perceived deficiencies in instructional quality in government-run schools
could weaken interpersonal relationships and/or result in ineffective (or negative) verbal and
social persuasion, ultimately stunting or regressing psychosocial development.
A final important contextual distinction is that private schools are more likely to use
English as a medium of instruction than their government-run counterparts, particularly
during early grades. As one parent noted, “we must give English medium education to
our children because it only gives better job opportunities.” Parent responses also suggest
that the availability of English medium during the early stages of private schooling may be
particularly valued. For example, one parent stated that if a child is first exposed to “Telugu
medium and if we change them later to English medium it will not work out and they [will]
suffer. . . so from the beginning we want them to have a strong [English] foundation.” If using
English as a medium of instruction is perceived to increase future academic or career success,
this may be another important channel through which private schools influence psychosocial
competencies.
2.3. MODEL
Consider a simple environment where the development of a child’s psychosocial competencies
is dependent on a parent’s choice to send them to private school or not. Specifically, in my
model, psychosocial outcomes for each child differ based on the type of school chosen. Fol-
lowing the factor structure of Carneiro et al. (2003) and others, school choice and subsequent
outcomes are assumed to be functions of observed family and child characteristics as well
as a vector of latent factors (θ). These factors are known to the parent but are imperfectly
observed by the researcher. This allows parents to sort children across schooling type based
on observed and unobserved characteristics. I model and interpret these unobserved factors
as child endowments of cognitive skill, health, and social skill: θ = (θC , θH , θS). Identifica-
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tion and interpretation of the unobserved factors relies on the inclusion of a set of imperfect
measurements that are not affected by the relevant schooling choice made by the parent. It is
also important to note that included in the observed family characteristics is a set of mater-
nal psychosocial competencies. These measures serve to control and allow for examination
of the intergenerational transmission of psychosocial traits.
2.3.1 Schooling Choice
The choice of sending a child to private school or not is modeled using a standard latent
index structure. Let the observed binary choice be given by Pi = 1 if child i attends private
school and Pi = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let P ∗i be the net utility from choosing private
school and characterize the decision rule:
Pi =

1 if P ∗i > 0
0 otherwise
.
For empirical analysis, net utility is modeled as a linear function of observed and unobserved
characteristics:
P ∗i = γZi + λP θi + Pi,
where Z is a vector of observed covariates, θ is a vector of unobserved factors, and P is an
idiosyncratic error term. Observed characteristics, unobserved factors, and the error term
are assumed to be statistically independent of each other: Z ⊥ θ ⊥ P .
2.3.2 Outcomes
For each child, it is assumed there are two possible realizations for each outcome of interest.
A potential outcome if the child attends private school (Y 1i ) and a potential outcome if they
attend a government-run school (Y 0i ). In the empirical implementation of the model, the
observed outcomes are discrete and ordinal in nature. As such, I again assume a latent index
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structure with each underlying potential outcome (Y ∗i ) linearly dependent on observed and
unobserved characteristics according to:
Y ∗ti = βtXi + λtY θi + tY i for t = 0, 1
where X is a vector of observed covariates and X ⊥ θ ⊥ 1Y ⊥ 0Y ⊥ P . The index
is discretized into V ordered values by a set of cut-points (κ) to produce the potentially
observed discrete outcomes:
Y ti = v if κt,v−1 < Y ∗ti < κt,v for t = 0, 1, v = 1, . . . , V.
While a child can potentially realize either outcome (t = 0, 1), the observed outcome
depends on the choice of schooling type. Specifically, using switching regression notation
(Quandt 1972), the observed outcome for any child can be written:
Yi = PiY 1i + (1− Pi)Y 0i .
2.3.3 Endowment Measurement System
In order to identify the joint distribution of the unobserved factors θ, the model includes a
system of imperfect endowment measurements that are observed prior to treatment. Follow-
ing Conti et al. (2011), each measurement is assumed to be a function of observables and a
dedicated unobserved endowment. Dedicated measures imply that, for example, height only
measures a child’s health and not their endowment of cognitive or social skill. This does
not imply, however, that an individual’s endowments are unrelated, as they are allowed to
be correlated—Cov (θi,j, θi,k) 6= 0, ∀ j 6= k.6 This measurement system not only allows for
identification, but also helps give interpretation to the unobserved factors by anchoring them
6Identification of a correlated factor model using the measurement system described in the empirical
analysis can be shown with slight modification to the proof provided in Conti et al. (2011).
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in observed data.
In the empirical implementation of the model, measures of cognitive skill (MC) and health
(MH) are continuous and assumed to follow a linear structure:
MCn,i = δCnWi + λCnθC,i + Cn,i for n = 1, . . . , NC
MHn,i = δHnWi + λHnθH,i + Hn,i for n = 1, . . . , NH
where W is a vector of observed covariates, NC the number of cognitive measures, and NH
the number of health measures. The social skill measures (MS) are ordinal or binary; thus
I assume a latent index structure given by:
M∗Sn,i = δSnWi + λSnθS,i + Sn,i for n = 1, . . . , NS
such that the observed value is given by:
MSn,i = v if κv−1 < M∗Sn,i < κv for v = 1, . . . , Vn
where Vn is the number of possible ordinal values for social skill measure MSn.
The scale of each of factor is set by normalizing the factor loading in the first measurement
of each endowment to one (λC1 = 1, λH1 = 1, λS1 = 1). Finally, identification requires that
the idiosyncratic errors in the measurement system are statistically independent from each
other and from the errors in the school choice and outcome equations: Cn ⊥ Hn ⊥ Sn ⊥
1Y ⊥ 0Y ⊥ P , ∀ n.
2.3.4 Identification and Estimation
Identification of the model is based on the following conditional independence assumption:
(
Y 0, Y 1
)
⊥ P | Z,X,W, θ.
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Notice that this is the same assumption used in standard matching strategies. The difference
between standard matching and the strategy used in this chapter lies in the fact that factor
endowments are imperfectly observed and are instead approximated with error by a system
of observed measurements.
A number of additional assumptions are made in order to estimate the model empirically.
First, I assume the latent factors follow a multivariate normal distribution given by:
θ ∼ N (µ,Σ)
where µ is a 3×1 vector and ∑ is a 3×3 matrix.7 The variance-covariance matrix is not restricted
to be diagonal as a child’s latent factors are allowed to correlated. Second, idiosyncratic errors
on all outcome equations, the choice equation, and discrete measurements are assumed to be
distributed normally with mean zero and variance one. This is the usual solution for keeping
latent response variables invariant to scale transformations. For continuous measurements,
errors are assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and unknown variance.
The density of outcomes over unobservables can be written:
ˆ ˆ ˆ
θC ,θH ,θS
f (Y, P,MC ,MH ,MS | Z,X,W, tC , tH , tS) dFθ (tC , tH , tS)
where Fθ (.) denotes the joint cumulative distribution of latent factors and f (.) denotes
the joint density of schooling choices, outcomes, and measurements. Note that conditional
on observables and unobservables, private schooling choice P and all measurements M are
independent.
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are used to estimate the model
parameters for computational convenience. I follow the procedures discussed in Carneiro
et al. (2003) and Hansen et al. (2004) for estimation.8 The key feature of the procedure
7A mixture of multivariate normals was also used to more flexibly approximate the distribution of latent
factors, but the improvement in the fit of the model was negligible.
8I run 50,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler and, after discarding the first 10,000 as a burn-in period,
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is that latent factors are drawn from their joint posterior distribution in each iteration
for each individual. The factor draws are subsequently used to update the other model
parameters including those of the joint distribution of factors itself. Not only is the procedure
computationally attractive, it also provides a distribution of parameter estimates which are
useful in simulating counterfactual choices and outcomes.
2.4. DATA
I use data from the Young Lives Study (YLS) which conducted surveys for a cohort of 2,011
children born January 2001 to June 2002 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. Currently
data are available from three rounds of surveys conducted in 2002, 2006-07, and 2009-10,
when children were approximately one, five, and eight years old, respectively. The study
collected detailed information on household and child characteristics, including questions on
both parent and child perceptions, attitudes, and feelings in addition to multiple rounds of
child cognitive test scores and health measures. After removing observations with missing
outcomes or covariates, I am left with a sample of 1,856 observations. Throughout the em-
pirical analysis, classification into the private school “treatment” group is defined as having
attended a private school in the 2007-08 and/or 2008-09 academic years.9
2.4.1 Psychosocial Outcomes
The outcomes of interest are based on a child’s agreement to a number of statements related
to self-efficacy and self-esteem during the 2009-10 collection cycle, when children were ap-
proximately eight years old. Agreement with each statement is measured on a Likert scale
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The statements are based on
include one out of every 40 iterations in the posterior estimates.
9Results are robust to alternate specifications of the treatment group.
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the educational psychology literature but were adapted, extensively pilot tested, and sub-
jected to psychometric validation by the YLS. The self-efficacy measure is based on the
statements: “If I try hard, I can improve my situation in life,” “I like to make plans for my
future studies and work,” and “If I study hard at school, I will be rewarded by a better job
in the future.” The statements relating to self-esteem are centered around the concepts of
pride and shame: “I am proud of my shoes or of having shoes,” “I am proud of my clothes,”
and “I am proud that I have the correct uniform.” Assuming the statements measure a
single underlying factor is broadly validated in Dercon and Krishnan (2009), and I obtain
similar Cronbach’s alphas of 0.57 and 0.69 for the self-efficacy and self-esteem statements,
respectively.10 As such, a single score is created for each outcome by averaging non-missing
responses across the three corresponding statements. However, due the limited number of
statements, the raw outcome measures take on a relatively small number of discrete values.
Furthermore, there is clear truncation on either end of the measures, suggesting that treating
them as continuous could result in significant bias. As such, I treat observed outcomes as
ordinal representations of an underlying latent index. In order to the reduce the computa-
tional burden of estimation, ordinal values with less than 50 observations are combined with
the closest neighboring value. This results in a total of seven and nine ordinal values for
the self-efficacy and self-esteem measures, respectively. Table 2.1 shows that eight year olds
enrolled in private school score significantly higher than their public school counterparts on
these raw measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem (see also Figure 2.1 for the distribution
across values).
2.4.2 Observed Covariates
A number of observed covariates are included in the outcome, measurement, and choice
equations to control for family background and other child characteristics. In all equations,
10It is commonly suggested a Cronbach’s alpha close to at least 0.7 is required for a “reliable” measure
(i.e. the items measure a single underlying factor). However, a small number of items and measurement
error also serve to lower Cronbach’s alpha.
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Table 2.1: Psychosocial Outcomes at 8 Years of Age by School Type: Raw Scores
Private School Public School
Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. n z-statistic p-value
Self-efficacy 4.25 0.529 773 4.00 0.569 1,083 -9.12 0.000
Self-esteem 4.07 0.741 773 3.60 0.795 1,083 -13.02 0.000
Source: Young Lives Study, India, younger cohort. Statements measured on Likert scale ranging from 1 to
5. Inividual’s raw score calculated by averageing non-missing responses across cooresponding statements.
Statistics reported from a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
I include a wealth index, number of siblings, father’s education, mother’s education, caste,
urban status, a set of region dummies, as well as the child’s gender and age in months. I
also include four psychosocial competency indices for the mother or primary caregiver of the
child: self-efficacy, self-esteem, inclusion, and trust.11 Similar to the child outcomes detailed
above, these indices are derived from agreement to a series of statements relating to each psy-
chosocial competency. However, unlike the child outcomes, there are enough statements and
variation in responses across statements to construct approximately continuous measures.
Specifically, the responses to each statement are standardized to create a set of z-scores with
mean zero and variance one. The composite indices are then created by taking the average
score across non-missing z-scores for each individual. The availability of such noncognitive
measures for both parent and child is one of the unique strengths of the YLS data. These
indices not only control for possible private school selection based on parental competencies,
but also allow for examination of the magnitude and channels through which psychosocial
traits may be transmitted from one generation to the next.
Lastly, I assume that in addition to the covariates above and unobserved child endow-
ments, school choice is also affected by the relative distance to a private versus a public
school. Specifically, in the choice equation I include a measure of how much longer it takes
(in minutes) to travel to a private versus a public school from the center of a child’s home
community.12 Summary statistics for all observed covariates are reported in Table 2.2.
11Mothers were the primary caregiver for over 95% of the sample.
12This measure is truncated at ±60 minutes.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Observed Covariates
Total Private School Public School
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Male 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.50
Wealth Index 0.45 0.19 0.58 0.18 0.37 0.15
Age 5.36 0.32 5.36 0.33 5.36 0.32
Siblings 1.55 1.07 1.31 0.95 1.72 1.12
Father Years Education 5.68 5.15 8.37 5.09 3.71 4.21
Mother Years Education 3.72 4.51 6.10 4.96 1.97 3.17
Urban 0.24 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.07 0.26
Scheduled Caste 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.42
Scheduled Tribe 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.23 0.18 0.38
Other Backward Classes 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50
Mother Self-efficacy 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.97 -0.18 0.99
Mother Self-esteem 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.97 -0.21 0.96
Mother Trust 0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.01 0.99
Mother Inclusion 0.00 1.00 0.21 1.01 -0.17 0.96
Add’l Min. to Private School 16.5 23.1 8.9 19.6 21.9 23.9
Source: Young Lives Study, India, younger cohort. Includes all observations without missing covariates or
outcomes (n=1,856).
2.4.3 Endowment Measurements
As measures of cognitive endowment, I use two tests administered during the second round
of data collection (age five)—the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) and the Cog-
nitive Development Assessment (CDA) quantitative subscale. The PPVT is a widely used
test of receptive vocabulary, while the CDA was designed by the International Evaluation
Association to assess cognitive development in four year olds. Validation of both measures as
used in the YLS are discussed in Cueto et al. (2009). As dedicated measures of latent child
health, I use height-for-age z-scores collected in the second round as well as weight-for-age
z-scores from both round one and two (approximately age one and five, respectively).13
During the second round of data collection, the parent or primary caregiver of each child
13Health measure z-scores are derived by the YLS by standardizing against an international reference
population.
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was asked about all activities carried out by the child during the most recent or typical
workday. Social endowment measures are derived from these responses and center around a
child’s interaction with other children. Specifically, as the first social endowment measure I
use the total number of activities the child completed with siblings, friends, or other children
(e.g. chores, playing, visiting relatives, watching TV). The second measure is an binary
indicator of whether or not the child spent time playing with friends explicitly (excludes
play with siblings or other children). Summary statistics for all measurements are reported
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Endowment Measurements (Age 5)
Total Private School Public School
Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. n
Cognitive Measures
PPVT (vocabulary) 0.00 1.00 1,772 0.26 1.13 736 -0.18 0.85 1,036
CDA (cognitive) 0.00 1.00 1,845 0.27 0.93 771 -0.19 1.00 1,074
Health Measures
Weight-for-age -1.87 0.93 1,851 -1.64 0.94 769 -2.03 0.89 1,082
Height-for-age -1.65 1.11 1,851 -1.40 1.03 769 -1.83 1.13 1,082
Weight-for-age (age 1) -1.54 1.12 1,841 -1.27 1.07 770 -1.73 1.11 1,071
Social Measures
Activities with children 3.29 1.10 1,854 3.20 1.15 772 3.35 1.06 1,082
Played with friends 0.55 0.50 1,854 0.47 0.50 772 0.60 0.49 1,082
Source: Young Lives Study, India, younger cohort. Health measures standardized against international
reference population.
2.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, I begin by evaluating the fit of the model to the empirical data and doc-
umenting the role of the unobserved endowments on selection into private school. I then
provide estimates of the effects of endowments on outcomes as well as the importance of
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the intergenerational transmission of psychosocial traits from mother to child. Finally, I
define and present the estimated treatment effects of private school. I also discuss how the
treatment effects vary over the distribution of endowments, maternal psychosocial traits,
and other observed characteristics.
2.5.1 Fit of the Model and the Role of Endowments
The MCMC estimation provides a posterior distribution of model parameters I use to simu-
late counterfactual choices and outcomes in order to evaluate the fit of the model and explore
the role of the unobserved endowments on selection into private school. Specifically, I draw
with replacement N individuals from the sample, and for each make K draws from the joint
posterior distribution of parameters.14 I then simulate the probability of choosing private
school for each individual according to:
Pˆi =
1
K
K∑
k=1
1 [γkZi + λP,kθi,k + Pi > 0] ,
where 1 [.] is the indicator function and  is drawn from the standard normal distribution.
Notice that unobserved factors for each individual are also drawn from posterior estimates
and thus vary over the K draws similar to the other parameters. Outcomes conditional on
attending a government-run or private school (t = 0, 1) are simulated as:
Yˆ ti =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(
βtkXi + λtY,kθi,k + tY i
)
where  is again drawn from a standard normal distribution. Combining results for schooling
choice and possible outcomes yields the expected observed outcome for each individual:
Yˆi = PˆiYˆ 1i +
(
1− Pˆi
)
Yˆ 0i .
14N is the same size as the actual data sample. K = 10.
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Using the simulated predictions, I next evaluate the fit of the model to the data. A com-
parison of the simulated and actual mean of private school enrollment is shown in Table 2.4.
Note that the model passes a goodness of fit test along the school choice dimension. Compar-
ing predicted psychosocial outcomes to the data requires placing the simulated continuous
outcomes back into discrete bins based on the cut-points produced during the MCMC esti-
mation. Figure 2.1 shows the discretized simulated outcomes match the actual data quite
well, and the model again passes tests of goodness of fit.
Table 2.4: Model Fit: School Choice
Actual Simulated Difference p-value
Private School (P = 1) 0.417 0.420 -0.003 0.747
Reported p-value from chi-squared goodness of fit test (Null Hypothesis: Simulated=Actual).
I next turn to the role of cognitive, health, and social endowments on selection into
private school. Figure 2.2 plots the simulated marginal distribution of the latent endowments
conditional on type of school attended. There is visible sorting of children with higher
cognitive and health endowments into private schools, which is confirmed by Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests. Conversely, there is sorting of children with lower social endowments into
private school.15 This highlights the importance of controlling for latent child endowments
in addition to family background when analyzing private school effects.
In order to shed further light on the impact of the unobserved endowments, I compute
the change in private school enrollment probability and expected outcomes for exogenous
movements along the endowment distributions. I begin with estimating the probability
of enrolling in private school for each percentile of a given endowment by integrating out
observable covariates and fixing the other endowments at their overall mean.16 As shown in
Figure 2.3, moving along the cognitive and health distributions is associated with an increase
15The unconditional correlation between cognitive and health endowments is 0.252, between cognitive and
social -0.064, and between social and health 0.031.
16Empirically, for each percentile p, I estimate E [P | θp] ≈ 1NK
∑K
k=1
∑N
i=1 1 [γkZi + λP,kθ
p
k > 0]. The
endowment vector percentile and means are computed for each of the K parameter draws.
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Figure 2.1: Goodness of Fit: Psychosocial Outcomes. Acutal data from Young Lives
Study, India, younger cohort. Simulations from the posterior estimates of the model. Re-
ported p-value from chi-squared goodness of fit test in parentheses (Null Hypothesis: Simu-
lated=Actual).
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Distribution of Endowments by School Type. Simulations from the
posterior estimates of the model. Reported p-value from two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test in parentheses. Null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same.
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in the probability of choosing private school. For example, moving from the 20th to 80th
percentile of the cognitive or health endowments increases a child’s probability of attending
private school by approximately 2.0% and 10.4%, respectively. Conversely, an analogous
percentile change along the social distribution decreases a child’s probability of attending by
approximately 18.8%. These results again demonstrate the selection that occurs based on
unobserved child traits.
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Figure 2.3: Effects of Endowments on Probability of Private School. Simulations from the
posterior estimates of the model.
Finally, Figure 2.4 plots the predicted changes in expected unconditional outcomes from
exogenous movements along each endowment distribution, again holding the other endow-
ments at their means.17 Here, I have normalized the expected value at the first percentile
to zero to compare the relative effect of moving along a given factor distribution. I have
also standardized outcomes to have mean zero and variance one so that effect sizes can be
interpreted as standard deviation changes. Comparing endowment effects, an exogenous
17Empirically I estimate E
[
Y j | θp] ≈ 1NK ∑Kk=1∑Ni=1 (βjkXi + λjY,kθpk) for (j = 0, 1) and then weight
by private school probability estimates to predict unconditional outcomes. All other results reported by
percentile are estimated analogously.
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increase in cognitive skill has the strongest effect on both psychosocial outcomes, followed
by an increase in social skill. For example, moving from the 20th to 80th percentile of the
cognitive distribution increases a child’s self-efficacy and self-esteem by about 0.15 and 0.25
standard deviations, respectively. Analogous estimates for social skill are about 0.10 and 0.15
standard deviations. Moving up the health distribution has a smaller effect on self-efficacy
and a negligible effect on self-esteem. Note that expected outcomes are not conditional on
private school choice; thus total endowment effects are capturing both direct effects and any
expected gains that occur from the increased probability of attending private school.
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Figure 2.4: Total Effects of Endowments. Simulations from the posterior estimates of the
model.
2.5.2 The Intergenerational Transmission of Psychosocial Traits
The inclusion of parental psychosocial measures in the YLS data allows for the unique
opportunity to examine if and how such competencies are transmitted from one generation
to the next. In order to investigate the intergenerational transmission of noncognitive traits
in the sample, I estimate the effects of maternal self-efficacy and self-esteem on private school
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enrollment and child outcomes. I follow a similar procedure as estimating endowment effects
in the previous section except that other observed covariates are held at their overall mean
while the simulated endowments are integrated out of the expected values.18
The total effects of moving along the maternal psychosocial competency distributions on
child outcomes are shown in Figure 2.5. Maternal competencies have large effects on child
self-efficacy; moving an otherwise average child from the 20th to 80th percentile of the mater-
nal self-efficacy and self-esteem distributions increases the outcome by 0.34 and 0.26 standard
deviations, respectively. There is an even stronger transmission between mother and child
self-esteem, though the effect of maternal self-efficacy on child self-esteem is considerably
weaker.
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Figure 2.5: Total Effects of Maternal Competencies. Simulations from the posterior estimates
of the model.
Of considerable interest to economists and policymakers alike is understanding not only
the magnitude of intergenerational transmission of noncognitive traits, but also the underly-
ing mechanisms at work. The model identified in this chapter allows for examination of one
18Recall that endowments and observed covariates are independent, but covariates themselves may be
correlated.
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possible channel—private school choice. Figure 2.6 shows that maternal self-efficacy and self-
esteem have positive effects on the probability of enrolling in private school. For example,
moving an otherwise average child from the 20th to 80th percentile of maternal self-efficacy
increases their probability of attending private school by approximately 12%. This suggests
that one channel through which psychosocial competencies may be transmitted from mother
to child is through the choice of sending the child to private school. In order to compare
the importance of this channel relative to the residual “direct” effect, I decompose the total
effects of maternal capacities on child outcomes through different channels according to:
Total Effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂E [Y | X, θ]
∂X?
=
Effect through school choice︷ ︸︸ ︷
1∑
t=0
E [Y | X, θ, P = t]× ∂Prob [P = t | X, θ]
∂X?
+
1∑
t=0
Prob [P = t | X, θ]× ∂E [Y | X, θ, P = t]
∂X?︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual "direct" effect
,
where X∗ is maternal self-efficacy or self-esteem. The effect through school choice reflects
the expected gain in child outcomes associated with the increased probability of attending
private school. The residual “direct” effect is most likely a combination of other behavioral
mechanisms and/or genetic transmission of noncognitive traits; the further exploration of
which is outside the scope of the current model. In practice, I decompose the simulated total
effects of moving an otherwise average child from the 20th to 80th percentile of the maternal
competency distributions using finite differencing.19
The results of the decomposition exercise are presented in Table 2.5. Overall, results
suggest that private school choice is a meaningful channel through which maternal self-
efficacy influences a child’s psychosocial development. For example, in the exercise, 9% of the
effect of maternal self-efficacy on child self-efficacy passes through private school choice. The
pass-through percentage from maternal self-efficacy to child self-esteem is over 40%, though
recall that the overall magnitude of this effect is relatively small. In contrast, the magnitude
19E.g. ∂Prob[P=1|X,θ]∂X? ≈ Prob[P=1|X,θ]X?80 −
Prob[P=1|X,θ]
X?20
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Figure 2.6: Effects of Maternal Competencies on Probability of Private School. Simulations
from the posterior estimates of the model.
of the school choice channel for maternal self-esteem effects are significantly smaller—less
than 3% for both outcome measures. This highlights that differing transmission mechanisms
are at play for alternate facets of psychosocial development.
Table 2.5: Decomposition of the Effects of Maternal Capacities on Child Outcomes
Maternal Self-efficacy Maternal Self-esteem
Private School Direct Total Private School Direct Total
Child Self-efficacy 0.09 0.91 1.00 0.03 0.97 1.00
Child Self-esteem 0.43 0.57 1.00 0.02 0.98 1.00
Note: Estimates based on simulations of movement for an observationally average child from the 20th to the
80th percentile of maternal self-efficacy and self-esteem distributions.
2.5.3 The Treatment Effect of Private School
This section defines and provides estimates of the causal effect of private school on childhood
measures of self-efficacy and self-esteem. Because counterfactual outcomes can be estimated
for all individuals in the population regardless of whether they attended private school or
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not, the distribution of person-specific treatment effects can be estimated. This highlights
one of the main benefits of the model—it allows for estimation of different treatment effects
over various subsets of the population.
I begin by defining the average effect of selecting a child at random from the population
and enrolling them in private school, also known as the average treatment effect (ATE). The
formal definition of the ATE of private school on child outcomes is given by:
E
[
Y 1 − Y 0
]
=
¨
E
[
Y 1 − Y 0 | X, θ
]
dFX,θ
where Y t is the potential outcome of attending private school (t = 1) or a government-run
school (t = 0) and FX,θ (.) denotes the joint distribution of X and θ. In practice, I use draws
from the posterior distribution of parameters (including latent endowments) to estimate the
ATE as:
E
[
Yˆ 1 − Yˆ 0
]
= 1
NK
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
[
E
[
Yˆ 1 |
(
Xi, θi,k; β1k , λ1Y,k
)]
− E
[
Yˆ 0 |
(
Xi, θi,k; β0k , λ0Y,k
)]]
where Yˆ j are the potential outcomes predicted by the model.20
Second, I estimate the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) and on the
not treated (ATNT). The ATT estimates the effect of private school on a child randomly
selected from population of children who were actually observed to attend private school.
Analogously, the ATNT estimates the effect on a random child who did not attend private
school. Formally, the ATT (t = 1) and ATNT (t = 0) are given by:
E
[
Y 1 − Y 0 | P = t
]
=
¨
E
[
Y 1 − Y 0 | X, θ, P = t
]
dFX,θ|P=t
where FX,θ|P=t denotes the joint distribution of X and θ given private school choice. Em-
pirically, I again use parameter draws from the posterior distribution to estimate the effects
20The N individuals are the actual sample and K = 1, 000.
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as:
E
[
Yˆ 1 − Yˆ 0 | P = t
]
= 1
NtK
K∑
k=1
Nt∑
i:P=t
[
E
[
Yˆ 1 |
(
Xi, θi,k; β1k , λ1Y,k
)]
− E
[
Yˆ 0 |
(
Xi, θi,k; β0k , λ0Y,k
)]]
whereNt denotes the number of individuals enrolled in private schools (t = 1) and government-
run schools (t = 0).
The estimated treatment effects are reported in Table 2.6. Outcomes have again been
standardized so that effect sizes can be interpreted as standard deviation changes. The
average treatment effect of attending private school between age five and eight is an increase
in self-efficacy and self-esteem measures of 0.15 and 0.28 standard deviations, respectively.
These results are within the range of credible estimates of private school effects on cognitive
outcomes in India. For example, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) find that private
school enrollment increases cognitive test scores an average of 0.23 standard deviations over
four years—ranging from no effect to 0.9 standard deviation depending on the school subject
tested. This suggests that private school in India may play at least as significant a role in
early psychosocial as in cognitive development.
Table 2.6: Treatment Effects of Private School
ATE ATT ATNT
Self-efficacy 0.152 0.125 0.172
(0.063) (0.079) (0.072)
Self-esteem 0.278 0.315 0.251
(0.056) (0.074) (0.065)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
When moving beyond the ATE, the estimated treatment effects differ based on observed
school choice, though differently for the two outcomes (see Table 2.6 and Figure 2.7). Effects
on self-efficacy are stronger among children that did not attend private school, while the
opposite is true for self-esteem. These results are consistent with a limited role of self-
efficacy gains in determining if parents send their child to private school—at least relative
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to other determining factors. However, it does leave scope for some sorting based on gains
to self-esteem.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Treatment Effect by School Type
Finally, I decompose the difference in simulated outcomes to gain a better understanding
of how treatment effects are driving the observed differences between private and public
school. Specifically, the observed difference in noncognitive outcomes presented in Table 2.1
is due to a combination of the ATT and selection bias. Table 2.7 presents the decomposition
for each outcome into these two sources. There is stark contrast in this exercise between
the noncognitive measures. Selection accounts for about 54% of the observed difference in
self-esteem, while the remaining 46% is attributed to the treatment. In contrast, 72% of the
observed difference in self-efficacy is due to selection, while the treatment accounts for only
28%. The distribution of treatment effects across family and child characteristics presented
in the next section help shed light on the source of these differences.
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Table 2.7: Decomposition of Observed Differences in Outcomes
Observed Diff ATT % ATT Selection % Selection
Self-efficacy 0.449 0.125 27.8 0.324 72.2
Self-esteem 0.685 0.315 46.0 0.370 54.0
Note: Observed difference simulated from the model estimates.
2.5.4 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Understanding which children may or may not benefit from private schooling has clear impli-
cations for parents and policymakers alike. In this section, I provide estimates of the hetero-
geneity of treatment effects along a number of household and child characteristics. I begin by
estimating the distribution of effects across a number of dichotomous observables—gender,
urbanization, and caste. Results are presented in Table 2.8 as well as Figures 2.8-2.10.21
While there is little difference between genders on average self-efficacy gains, males have
higher potential gains on self-esteem. The average treatment effect on self-esteem was also
stronger for children living in urban areas. In contrast, rural students have higher poten-
tial gains on self-efficacy from attending private school, though estimates are less precise.
Finally, while there is little difference between castes on average gains to self-esteem, chil-
dren from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes have significantly higher potential gains on
self-efficacy. This has direct implications for the recently passed Right to Education Act,
which effectively moves children from these lower castes into private school. The effects of
this policy on child psychosocial outcomes is explored further in the later counterfactual
analysis.
I next document the heterogeneity of treatment effects along the unobserved child en-
dowments. Specifically, Figure 2.11 presents the average treatment effect for each percentile
of a given endowment after integrating out observable covariates and fixing the other en-
dowments at their overall mean. The effect of the treatment on self-efficacy is stronger at
the top of each of the endowment distributions, suggesting that endowments and private
21Effects are computed analogously to ATT and ATNT.
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Table 2.8: Average Treatment Effect by Select Observables
Male Female Urban Rural SC/ST OC
Self-efficacy 0.138 0.169 0.111 0.166 0.214 0.124
(0.075) (0.082) (0.125) (0.069) (0.100) (0.071)
Self-esteem 0.349 0.197 0.377 0.246 0.276 0.278
(0.064) (0.076) (0.116) (0.062) (0.091) (0.062)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. SC/ST = Scheduled Caste or Tribe, OC = other caste.
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Treatment Effect by Gender
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of Treatment Effect by Urban Status
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of Treatment Effect by Caste
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school are complements in the production of the outcome. In other words, children with
higher cognitive, health, or social endowments can expect higher gains to self-efficacy from
attending private school. A similar relationship is found between self-esteem and cognitive
and social endowments. Conversely, effects on self-esteem are strongest at the bottom of
the health distribution. This suggests that to some extent private school may serve as a
substitute for health in the development of a child’s self-esteem.
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Figure 2.11: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity: Endowments
Turning now to the role of parental psychosocial traits in determining treatment effects,
I examine the heterogeneity of treatment along the maternal self-efficacy and self-esteem
distributions. Again, results are presented for each percentile of a given characteristic af-
ter integrating out endowments and holding other covariates at their respective means. As
shown in Figure 2.12, maternal self-esteem and private schooling play complementarity roles
in development of the child outcomes. In contrast, maternal self-efficacy does not impact
treatment effects on child self-esteem, but has a very strong influence on child self-efficacy
effects. For example, moving from the 20th to 80th percentile of the maternal self-efficacy dis-
tribution decreases the average treatment effect on child self-efficacy by about 0.24 standard
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deviations. This suggests that private school may serve as a substitute for the acquisition of
self-efficacy through parental transmission.
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Figure 2.12: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity: Household Characteristics
The final source of heterogeneity I examine is household wealth. The analysis presented
thus far have excluded discussion on how variation in the quality of private schools could be
influencing results. As an example, the complementarity between cognitive endowment and
private school could be driven by children with higher cognitive endowments being sent to
higher quality private schools. As an arguably more direct examination of this school quality
influence, Figure 2.12 presents the heterogeneity of treatment effects along the household
wealth distribution. Results show that wealth and private school are complements in the
production of each of the outcomes; though the relationship is stronger for self-esteem. This is
consistent with wealthier parents sending children to higher quality private schools resulting
in significantly higher noncognitive returns; however there could be other mechanisms at
work as well. Note that this does not invalidate the findings presented thus far as wealth
and other covariates serve to control for variation in school quality in all model estimates.
However, heterogeneity along wealth and other dimensions does caution that the main results
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should be viewed as average effects as private school quality likely plays a role in determining
psychosocial gains from attendance.
In light of the observations on treatment effect heterogeneity, I now return briefly to
the results presented in the previous section. First note that selection into private school is
positively influenced by child endowments, maternal psychosocial traits, wealth, being male,
coming from a higher caste, and living in an urban area. Almost all of these characteristics
are also associated with higher treatment effects on child self-esteem.22 In contrast, for self-
efficacy, it is children with low maternal self-efficacy, coming from a lower caste, and living
in a rural area that have the most to gain from the treatment. However, these are the very
children who are less likely to be enrolled in private school. These observations help explain
the results presented in Table 2.6 and decomposed in Table 2.7. Namely, the ATT is higher
than the ATNT for self-esteem, while the opposite is true for self-efficacy. These findings
also have a clear influence on the results of the counterfactual analysis presented in the next
section.
2.6. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION ACT: A
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS
India passed the Right to Education Act (RTE) in 2009, making education a fundamental
right for every child aged 6 to 14. As part of the law, private schools are required to reserve
25% of capacity for enrollment of disadvantaged populations—predominately children from
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.23 The cost of attendance is to be reimbursed to
private schools by the state. This policy of caste-based reservation in private schools stems
from the perceived difference in quality between school types. Policymakers believe the gap
22Caste and health endowment are the only exceptions.
23Orphans, HIV affected, disabled, and the very poor may also qualify as disadvantaged.
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between disadvantaged children and their more fortunate counterparts is worsened by the
disparity in private school enrollment.
In order to shed light on how the RTE may effect the psychosocial development of different
populations of children in India, I conduct a counterfactual simulation roughly consistent
with the policy change. Specifically, I estimate the effect of moving the required number of
disadvantaged children from government-run schools into private schools to reach the 25%
threshold for the sample population. These children are not, however, selected at random
from the pool of qualified candidates. Instead I move the children with the highest net utility
from attending private school but who would choose not to enroll without the simulated
policy change. Intuitively, this assumes that it is the disadvantaged children closest to the
utility threshold for enrollment that will be pushed to attend private school by the policy
(i.e. max {P ∗ < 0}).
I conduct the analysis under two alternate assumptions about the implementation of the
policy. First, I assume private school capacity is fully flexible and increases to allow the
required enrollment of disadvantaged students without the displacement of others. Second,
I assume the overall capacity of private schools remains unchanged, and the addition of
disadvantaged children to obtain the 25% threshold results in the direct displacement of
children who would otherwise attend private school. Displaced children are also not selected
at random, but are identified as having the lowest net utility from private school of those who
would choose to enroll without the policy change and are not classified as disadvantaged.
The results of the counterfactual policy experiments are presented in Table 2.9. The first
column shows the effects on the disadvantaged children moved into private school due to
the policy change under the fixed capacity scenario. On average, these children experienced
an increase in self-efficacy of nearly 0.21 standard deviations. Note that this is considerably
higher than the estimated effect on a child drawn at random from the entire population (i.e.
the ATE of Table 2.6). However, the expected increase in self-esteem of 0.27 is quite similar
to that of a randomly drawn child. In contrast to the affected disadvantaged children, those
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displaced from private school by the policy experience lower expected outcomes. This high-
lights a significant potential cost of the proposed policy. However, notice that the positive
point estimates for the disadvantaged children are larger in magnitude than the negative
effects on displaced children for self-efficacy. This is due to the heterogeneity of treatment
effects discussed in the previous section. Finally, the last column shows the results assuming
flexible private school capacity and no displacement. The average effects on disadvantaged
children moved into private school are very similar to the fixed capacity scenario. However,
the number of disadvantaged children affected by the policy change increases from 2.1% to
3.3% of the population.
Table 2.9: Counterfactual Results
Fixed Capacity Flexible
CapacityTreated Displaced
Self-efficacy (ATE) 0.205 -0.128 0.205
(0.109) (0.084) (0.104)
Self-esteem (ATE) 0.271 -0.274 0.270
(0.103) (0.078) (0.097)
% of Population 2.1 2.1 3.3
(0.69) (0.69) (0.76)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Treated refers to the children moved into private school due to the
policy change.
When interpreting the counterfactual results in terms of the RTE, several caveats warrant
further discussion. First, the RTE requires each private school to reserve 25% of capacity
for disadvantaged children, not 25% of capacity as a group. In reality, individual private
schools are at various levels of compliance, with some well over the required 25% threshold at
the baseline. This implies the estimated quantity of disadvantaged students affected by the
policy is likely underestimated in the above experiment. Furthermore, the individual treat-
ment effects are likely more nuanced due the patterns of compliance across private schools of
varying quality. Second, the experiments above do not account for possible spillover effects
of the changing enrollment patterns. For example, a large swell of disadvantaged students in
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private schools could conceivably have negative consequences on the psychosocial develop-
ment of those already enrolled. I will note, however, that Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2015) find no evidence of negative spillover effects on cognitive outcomes in their randomized
school voucher trial. Despite these caveats, the counterfactual analysis provides valuable in-
sights into the patterns and potential costs that may be expected to arise from the continued
implementation of the RTE.
2.7. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides novel evidence of the influence of school context on early noncognitive
development of children in India. I find that the effects of private schooling on child self-
efficacy and self-esteem are at least as large as previously estimated effects on many cognitive
test scores. Furthermore, I find effects differ across important family characteristics as
well as unobserved child endowments. I also uncover differences in how private schooling
and other individual characteristics affect alternate measures of psychosocial development
(i.e. self-efficacy versus self-esteem). This highlights the importance of recognizing the
multidimensional nature of what is often coined “noncognitive skill” in emerging economic
research.
Understanding the effects of Indian private schools on self-efficacy and self-esteem can
begin to delineate which factors of schooling are most important for a child’s developmental
health and help target educational policies most effectively. This chapter takes an important
step towards understanding the mechanisms linking educational context to the development
of noncognitive traits in young children in the developing world. In future work, I plan
to further explore what dimensions of private schooling—and education more broadly—are
most impactful on early social and emotional development.
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3. CHILDHOOD HEALTH AND PRENATAL
EXPOSURE TO SEASONAL FOOD SCARCITY IN
ETHIOPIA1
3.1. INTRODUCTION
An estimated 805 million people globally—roughly one out of every nine—still suffer from
chronic undernourishment (FAO 2014). In many of the poorest developing countries, in-
cluding Ethiopia, estimates are more than one out of every three. Despite a long history
of attempts to address food security, an estimated 40% of households in Ethiopia are still
classified as food energy deficient by the World Food Programme (2014). A heavy reliance
on small-scale rainfed agriculture combined with highly localized agricultural markets make
Ethiopia’s erratic climatic conditions a significant source of food uncertainty. Moreover, even
in years of fairly typical seasonal patterns of cultivation, lack of storage capacity and costly
transport can lead to measurable differences in food availability over the agricultural cycle
(FAO 2004; WFP 2014). While seasonal effects on nutritional intake may be mild in com-
parison to more extreme weather phenomenon (i.e. drought, flood, monsoon), they could
1The data used in this chapter come from Young Lives, a 15-year study of the changing nature of childhood
poverty in Ethiopia, India (Andhra Pradesh), Peru and Vietnam (www.younglives.org.uk). Young Lives is
core-funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development (DFID) and co-funded from
2010 to 2014 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed here are those of the
author. They are not necessarily those of Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID or other funders.
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still have a substantial impact among vulnerable groups of the population. In this chapter
I focus on one such group—children in the fetal stages of development.
There is growing support in the biomedical literature for the hypothesis that poor ma-
ternal nutrition during pregnancy can lead to permanent fetal adaptations that affect health
throughout a child’s life (Gluckman and Hanson 2005). This “fetal origins” hypothesis has
recently garnered interest among economists, who have attempted to establish and quantify
the casual impact of such a mechanism.2 These studies have often used uncommon and
arguably exogenous events such as famine or disease epidemic to identify the causal effects
of prenatal nutritional environment. While many of these studies find significant effects from
such environmental shocks, less is known about the magnitude of effects due to more normal
variations in food availability.
In this chapter, I use a unique longitudinal data set to examine the effects of prenatal
exposure to seasonal variations in food scarcity on childhood health in Ethiopia. My exposure
measure is derived by combining individual date of birth with survey data collected shortly
after birth at the local community level. Importantly, the survey contains explicit data on
months when food becomes harder to obtain or more expensive within each community.
Identification relies on the assumption that prenatal exposure to reported months of food
scarcity, conditional on community and month of birth fixed effects, is uncorrelated with
any unobserved determinants of examined child health outcomes. Under this assumption,
I am able to identify the impact of in-utero exposure to reported seasonal food scarcity on
health outcomes measured at age one, five, and eight for a cohort of Ethiopian children born
between May 2001 and May 2002. My main finding is that exposure has a significant negative
impact on height by age five that strengthens by age eight. Moreover, effects decrease with
household wealth and maternal education and are stronger when exposure occurs during the
first trimester of gestation. In contrast, effects on child body mass are only identified at age
one and when exposure is concentrated in the second trimester.
2For a review of the literature, see Currie (2009); Almond and Currie (2011); Currie and Almond (2011);
Currie and Vogl (2013).
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There are many studies of developed countries that have found month or season of birth
to be robustly correlated with health outcomes such as birthweight, life expectancy, and
height.3 A smaller but growing body of literature has established similar pattens in the
developing world. For example, using a sample of Indian children under three years of
age, Lokshin and Radyakin (2012) find those born during monsoon months are significantly
shorter than children born in fall or winter months. In Gambia, Rayco-Solon et al. (2005)
show the incidence of small-for-gestational age was higher among children born at the end of
the “hungry season,” while the peak incidence of preterm births paralleled increases in agri-
cultural labor demand and malaria infections. Moore et al. (2004) show that birth during the
hungry season resulted in increased infant mortality rates in both Gambia and Bangladesh.
The association between season of birth and health outcomes also appears to persist into
adulthood in the developing world. For example, McEniry and Palloni (2010) find in-utero
exposure to the hungry season was associated with higher probabilities of heart disease and
diabetes among a sample of older Puerto Ricans. Researchers have most commonly argued
that prevalence of disease, seasonal maternal labor supply, or nutritional intake associated
with agricultural output are likely channels through which calendar time of birth may affect
health outcomes in the developing world. While much of the season of birth literature is
suggestive that the timing of birth in relation to the agricultural cycle is important, it is
difficult to disentangle prenatal nutritional effects from exposure to disease or other seasonal
factors.
There is a growing body of related economic literature that examines the effects of early
exposure to localized weather shocks. These studies have most commonly relied on changes
in annual rainfall or ambient temperature patterns as exogenous sources of variation. While
this literature arguably implements stronger identification strategies than the season of birth
literature, it still has trouble isolating the relevant mechanisms at work. Maccini and Yang
(2009), for example, find higher rainfall in early life is associated with better health outcomes
3See, for example, Doblhammer and Vaupel (2001); Kihlbom and Johansson (2004); Tanaka et al. (2007);
Strand et al. (2011).
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for Indonesian women, but not for men. They attribute the positive association to the
influence of rainfall on increased agricultural output and lower food prices. Rocha and
Soares (2015), on the other hand, attribute a positive relationship between rainfall and
birth outcomes in Brazil to increased access to safe drinking water and consequently lower
prevalence of disease. Still other studies find increased rainfall early in life has negative
consequences for later outcomes (e.g. Kim 2010; Aguilar and Vicarelli 2011). Such negative
correlations are generally attributed to the disease environment, increased maternal labor
supply, or a negative impact of excessive rain on agricultural production. In Africa, for
example, Kudamatsu et al. (2014) find that increased rainfall can negatively effect infant
mortality in regions with epidemic malaria while drought shocks can have a negative impact
in arid areas. Similarly for Mexico, Skoufias et al. (2011) find that weather shocks associated
with rainfall and temperature can have substantial negative as well as positive effects that
vary across geographic regions.
In this chapter, I make strides towards isolating the impact of seasonal changes in pre-
natal nutrition on health outcomes by using a treatment measure that is both localized
and explicitly based on exposure to food scarcity. A complication with using environmental
shocks for identification is the presence of multiple channels through which weather changes
have been argued to effect health outcomes. Moreover, even when weather patterns are
convincing linked to changes in agricultural production, it is not inherently clear how effects
travel through the supply chain and ultimately impact food availability and/or prices. To
my knowledge, this is the first study to use an explicit measure of food scarcity to circumvent
the ambiguity surrounding the use of environmental shocks, such as rainfall or temperature,
as instruments for nutritional deprivation. This is also the first study to use a localized
instrument to examine how season of gestation impacts later health outcomes. Localization
of the measure allows me to control for seasonal trends that occur at the country level but
are unrelated to food availability. Finally, beyond improved isolation of prenatal nutritional
environment, having health outcomes collected repeatedly over a period of rapid physical
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growth adds novel evidence on gestation being a “sensitive” period of development. Specifi-
cally, the pattern of effects across time shed light on how easy or hard it is to make up for
poor nutrition during early development with increased health inputs at later stages.
Consistent with the view of gestation as a “sensitive” period of development, I find
that exposure has a significant negative impact on child height that strengthens as children
age. Specifically, I estimate that an additional month of prenatal exposure to reported
seasonal food scarcity decreases height by at least 0.31 cm by age five and 0.41 cm by
age eight. The magnitude of these effects are similar to a one-third standard deviation
decrease in the household wealth index used in my benchmark specification. As an outside
comparison, Dercon and Porter (2014) estimate that infant exposure to the 1984 Ethiopian
famine decreased height at least 5 cm by early adulthood and was accompanied by an
estimated annual income loss of 5%.4 I also find that effects decrease monotonically with
household wealth and maternal education and are stronger during the first trimester of
gestation. In contrast to height, effects on child body mass are statistically significant only
at age one for exposure during the second trimester. This is consistent with height and
weight being measures of health variation in the long-run and short-run, respectively. I find
no evidence that seasonal variation of water quality or maternal labor supply are driving
results, suggesting that I am indeed capturing the effects of seasonal changes in nutritional
intake on child health outcomes. Likewise, I find no evidence that results are driven by
seasonal fertility patterns within local communities or selective mortality of children on the
basis of exposure to seasonal food scarcity. Overall, my results highlight that in addition to
the effects of severe famine conditions identified in many studies, more typical variation in
prenatal nutritional environment can have lasting impacts on health in the developing world.
The remainder of this chapter is presented as follows. Section 3.2 begins by discussing
the data and construction of the prenatal exposure measure. Section 3.3 describes the em-
4Dercon and Porter (2014) estimated a significant impact only on those aged 12-36 months during the
peak of the famine. Effects are not identify for children in-utero, although the authors cannot rule out that
potentially severe mortality selection dominates scarring for this group.
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pirical strategy, and Section 3.4 presents the results. Section 3.5 assesses potential alternate
channels of correlation including seasonal patterns of fertility, water quality, seasonal labor
supply, and selective mortality. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. DATA
I use unique data from the Young Lives Study (YLS) to conduct an empirical analysis of
the impact of prenatal exposure to relative food scarcity on later child health outcomes in
Ethiopia. The YLS conducted surveys for a cohort of 2,000 children born between May 2001
and May 2002 in twenty sites across the country. Currently data is available from three
rounds of surveys conducted in 2002, 2006, and 2009—when children were approximately
one, five, and eight years old. The study collects detailed information on household and child
characteristics, including anthropometric markers such as height and weight. In addition, a
community level survey was conducted during the first wave of data collection, when children
were 6-18 months old. These data were obtained on a variety of topics through interviews
with key community leaders such as government officials, municipal leaders, and village
headmen.
3.2.1 A Measure of Prenatal Exposure to Seasonal Food Scarcity
Regional agroecosystems across Ethiopia are quite diverse, particularly in terms of rain-
fall and elevation. This can result in substantial variations in crop yield patterns across
geographic regions. Moreover, agricultural markets in Ethiopia consist primarily of small
farmers and traders who produce and sell product in local markets. According to a 2004
report from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “these [local]
markets function in relative isolation and grain movements from surplus to deficit areas are
constrained by high transport costs due to poor road infrastructure, weak market information
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systems, and a quasi monopoly in the transportation sector.” The combination of a limited
agricultural market and varied agroclimatic conditions results in meaningful variations in
food availability patterns across geographic regions of Ethiopia.
In light of these geographic diversities, I use relevant data collected at the local commu-
nity level to construct my measure of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity. A com-
munity survey was conducted at each of the sites selected to participate in the YLS. While
poor and food-poor areas were oversampled by the study, the communities span Ethiopia
geographically, and are contained in the regions where almost 97% of the population reside.
Specifically, communities were sampled from the capital city of Addis Ababa and the regional
states of Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, and Tigray.
My exposure measure is constructed on the basis of the following community survey
question:
In which months of the year does food become harder to obtain / more expensive?
Data collectors recorded responses to this question by ticking ’yes’ or ’no’ for each month
of the year. I use the survey responses for 22 of the 23 local communities, with the last
community excluded from analysis due to missing food scarcity data. On average, non-
missing communities reported just over 4.5 months of relative food scarcity, with a range
of three to eight months (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.2 shows the percent of all communities
reporting food scarcity by calender month. In anticipation of later analysis, data is also
reported for the subset of five communities in or around the Ethiopian capital of Addis
Ababa. On aggregate, more communities reported relative scarcity from October to January
while less reported scarcity from March to June. This corresponds to a reported average
increase in food availability following what is considered Ethiopia’s main harvest season,
which typically runs from October to February.
The community surveys were conducted during the last few months of 2002, shortly after
the youngest children in the cohort of interest were born. While it was not explicitly specified
that respondents answer the food scarcity question in relation to the most recent year or
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Figure 3.1: Number of Reported Months of Seasonal Food Scarcity. Source: Author’s calcu-
lations using data from Young Lives Study, Ethiopia.
Figure 3.2: Reported Seasonal Food Scarcity by Calendar Month. Source: Author’s calcu-
lations using data from Young Lives Study, Ethiopia.
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years, responses are consistent with available food pricing data. Figure 3.3 shows the monthly
price in Addis Ababa of the four major grains harvested in Ethiopia from September 2000
to May 2002. As sample children were born between May 2001 and May 2002, the examined
time frame completely spans when the children were in-utero. The observed pattern of
prices over the time frame is generally consistent with the data on relative food scarcity
reported by the Addis Ababa survey communities shown in Figure 3.2—higher prices from
September to February and lower from March to August. Thus, the pricing data provides
further evidence that responses from the community survey measure seasonal food scarcity
while sample children were in-utero.
Figure 3.3: Monthly Average Prices of Main Cereals, Addis Ababa. Source: FAO (2004).
I combine the community level food scarcity data with individual date of birth to com-
pute the days of prenatal exposure to relative food scarcity for each child. Conception for
a full-term birth is estimated precisely 270 days prior to birth allowing division of the ges-
tational period into three trimesters of 90 days each. For preterm births, gestation length
and corresponding exposure days are adjusted based on the reported number of weeks pre-
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mature.5 The density of the exposure measure is shown in Figure 3.4. On average, children
were exposed to an estimated 103 days of reported food scarcity in-utero, with a standard
deviation of 49 days.
Figure 3.4: Prenatal Days Exposed to Reported Seasonal Food Scarcity. Source: Author’s
calculations using data from Young Lives Study, Ethiopia. Histogram with 30 day window
for each bin.
3.2.2 Health Outcomes and Other Data
In my empirical analysis I focus on two child health outcomes—height and body mass index.6
Height captures a child’s restricted growth potential associated with the chronic or long-term
effects of malnourishment. In contrast, body mass is more sensitive to short-term health
changes as it captures weight loss associated with acute undernutrition. Outcomes were
measured at each round of data collection—when children were approximately one, five, and
58% of all births were reported as preterm. Of these, 75% reported the number of weeks premature.
To construct exposure for the remaining 25%, I assign them the median of reported weeks premature (two
weeks).
6Body mass index is calculated as weight (kg) divided by the square of height (m).
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eight years old. Repeated observations during this period of rapid physical development is
one of the benefits of the YLS data. Specifically, the pattern of effects across time can shed
light on how easy or hard it is to make up for poor nutrition during early development with
increased health inputs at later stages. Panel A of Table 3.1 gives descriptive statistics for
the outcomes at each age. For ease of interpretation, I express height in centimeters and I
standardize the body mass index to have mean zero and variance one. By either measure,
malnutrition is quite severe among the sample population of children—stunting and wasting
prevalence were both over 20% by age eight.7
In addition to prenatal exposure to reported food scarcity, a number of household and
child characteristics are used in the empirical analysis to help control for demographic and
socioeconomic effects on child health outcomes. These include gender, number of older
siblings, a household wealth index, mother’s height, mother’s education, child ethnicity,
level of antenatal care, and weeks premature at birth.8 In a robustness analysis, I also
make use of other YLS data in attempt to evaluate alternate mechanisms that may be
driving results. First, I use individual level data on the household’s main source of drinking
water. Reported responses were grouped into four sources—unprotected (e.g. river, pond,
unprotected well), piped directly into private dwelling/yard, public standpipe/tubewell, or
other source. Second, I use community survey data to construct a measure of prenatal
exposure to seasonal increases in local labor demand. Specifically, I use responses to the
following survey question:
In which months of the year is there relatively more work to do?
With this data, I construct the new exposure measure in an analogous fashion as my measure
7Prevalence of child stunting is the percentage of children whose height-for-age is more than two standard
deviations below the median for the international reference population. Wasting is defined analogously using
weight-for-height.
8YLS provides a constructed household wealth index for each of the three survey rounds. After taking
the log and standardizing each to have mean zero and variance one, I use the standardized average across
non-missing values as my household wealth index. Mother’s education reported as “adult literacy” included
in the one to four years of education category. Level of antenatal care was derived by YLS based on time of
first visit, number of visits, and whether mothers had a tetanus injection.
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of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity. Descriptive statistics for household and child
characteristics are presented in Panel B of Table 3.1.
3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Empirical analysis of the effects of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity on child health
outcomes is based on the following benchmark specification:
Yidc = α + δExpdc + βXidc + θc + µm + uidc, (3.1)
where Yidc is a health outcome for individual i, born on date d, in community c; Expdc is
my measure of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity; Xidc are household and child
characteristics; θc is a fixed effect for community of residence; µm is a fixed effect for month
of birth; and uidc is a random error term. I estimate the equation separately for child height
and body mass outcomes measured at approximately one, five, and eight years of age. The
coefficient of interest is that on prenatal exposure to relative food scarcity δ. Note that the
exposure measure varies by date of birth d and community of residence c. Throughout the
analysis, exposure days are expressed in thirty day units so coefficients can be interpreted
as approximate monthly effects. Household and child characteristics include age of the child
in months when the outcome was measured, a household wealth index, number of older
siblings and dummies for gender, mother’s education, mother’s height, child ethnicity, level
of antenatal care, and weeks premature at birth.9
Identification relies on the assumption that prenatal exposure to reported months of
9Approximately 11.8% of individuals were missing data on mother’s height and 6.5% on level of antenatal
care. I avoid dropping these observations in the reported analysis by including dummy indicators for those
missing either measure. For maternal height, I implement this by including dummy variables for each decile
of the distribution opposed to using a continuous measure. Results are also robust to the exclusion of these
two controls.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Health Outcomes and Other Data
Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs.
Panel A — Child Health Outcomes
Height (cm) Body Mass Index (BMI)
Age 1 70.8 5.48 1849 Age 1 0.0 1.00 1756
Age 5 103.7 5.38 1810 Age 5 0.0 1.00 1810
Age 8 120.4 6.58 1784 Age 8 0.0 1.00 1784
Panel B — Household and Child Characteristics
Male 0.53 0.50 1899 Antenatal Care
Older Siblings 2.64 2.38 1899 None 0.56 0.50 1775
Wealth Index 0.00 1.00 1899 Low 0.17 0.37 1775
Mother’s Height (cm) 158.6 5.88 1675 Medium 0.11 0.32 1775
Mother’s Education High 0.16 0.36 1775
None 0.53 0.50 1890 Weeks Premature
1 to 4 years 0.22 0.41 1890 None 0.92 0.24 1899
4 to 8 years 0.15 0.36 1890 1 to 2 weeks 0.04 0.20 1899
>8 years 0.09 0.29 1890 >2 weeks 0.02 0.14 1899
Child Ethnicity Unknown 0.02 0.15 1899
Amhara 0.29 0.45 1899 Water Source
Gurage 0.08 0.27 1899 Unprotected 0.44 0.50 1899
Oromo 0.21 0.41 1899 Private Pipe 0.11 0.31 1899
Tigrian 0.23 0.42 1899 Public Standpipe/Well 0.40 0.49 1899
Wolavta 0.05 0.21 1899 Other 0.05 0.21 1899
Other 0.14 0.35 1899 Prenatal Days Exposed
to High Labor Demand
121.0 67.8 1899
Source: Young Lives Study, Ethiopia, young cohort. Sample of children without missing community data
on seasonal food scarcity (n = 1,899).
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food scarcity is uncorrelated with any unobserved determinants of examined child health
outcomes. It is clearly the case that community of residence is likely to be correlated with
both health outcomes and the exposure measure, as climatic conditions and household de-
mographics vary considerably across Ethiopia. However, the inclusion of community dummy
variables ensures that effects associated with geographic area are controlled for. An addi-
tional concern is the existence of unobserved socioeconomic or demographic determinants
of child health that correlate with seasonal patterns of fertility, and hence the exposure
measure. However, the inclusion of month of birth dummies controls for seasonal effects
that occur at the country level and are not related to exposure to food scarcity.10 It is still
conceivable that seasonal fertility patterns could correlate with unobserved characteristics
within communities, but as detailed in later robustness analysis, I find no evidence of this
based on the rich set of observable household characteristics available.
Even under the identifying assumption, interpretation of the coefficient of interest δ
requires careful consideration. Due to collinearity, δ is a measure of the effect of exposure
during the approximately nine months prior to birth relative to the first three months after
birth (i.e. the first three months after birth is the reference period). However, imposing a
relatively mild assumption can allow for further interpretation of the empirical estimates.
Specifically, I assume that the effects of exposure are weakly negative regardless of whether
exposure occurs during pregnancy or the months just after birth. Under this assumption, I
interpret the empirical δ estimates as the minimum total effect of prenatal exposure to food
scarcity according to the following proposition:
Proposition. If the effects of exposure to relative food scarcity the year following concep-
tion are weakly negative during pregnancy and after birth, then δ is the minimum effect (in
absolute terms) of prenatal exposure to food scarcity. Proof: see Appendix C.
In addition to the benchmark specification, I examine heterogeneity of effects across a
10Month of birth dummies also help control for nonlinear growth in children that may not be captured by
the continuous age of child control.
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number of dimensions to shed further light on the relevant mechanisms at work. I analyze
how effects vary over household wealth, maternal education, and the timing of exposure over
stages of gestation. Results are compared with previous findings in the medical and economic
literatures. I also examine heterogeneity across sources of water supply and exposure to
seasonal variation in work availability to assess if results may be partially operating through
access to clean water or changes in maternal labor supply in congruence with food availability.
Lastly, I discuss and evaluate the potential influence of selective mortality on the basis of
prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity. This may be a particular concern because of the
high infant mortality rates in Ethiopia.
3.4. RESULTS
3.4.1 Benchmark Results
The main results from the benchmark specification are presented in Table 3.2. Under the
assumptions specified in the previous section, I interpret reported coefficients as lower (ab-
solute) bounds on the total effects of exposure to seasonal food scarcity on corresponding
health outcomes. The first three columns report the estimated exposure effect on child height
measured at approximately age one, five, and eight. The last three columns give analogous
results for the standardized measure of body mass.
Column (1) shows a lower bound on the effect of exposure on age one height is not
identified at a statistically significant level. However, by age five, the estimated coefficient
has greatly increased in magnitude and is statistically significant. The coefficient implies,
holding other independent variables constant, an additional month of prenatal exposure to
food scarcity leads to a decrease in height of at least 0.31 cm. Moreover, column (3) shows
the magnitude of the estimated effect increases to 0.41 cm by age eight. This pattern is
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consistent with a divergence of heights between ages one and eight on the basis of prenatal
exposure to food scarcity. This would imply that parents are unable and/or unwilling to fully
make up for the early effects of exposure. This is consistent with the view of gestation as a
“sensitive” period of child development in which nutritional and other inputs are difficult to
substitute for in later stages of life (Cunha and Heckman 2007).
Table 3.2: Effects of Prenatal Exposure to Seasonal Food Scarcity on Child Health Outcomes
Height1 Height5 Height8 BMI1 BMI5 BMI8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp -0.051 -0.307* -0.407*** -0.034 -0.010 0.010
(0.210) (0.167) (0.118) (0.027) (0.028) (0.020)
Obs 1,840 1,804 1,776 1,748 1,804 1,776
R2 0.403 0.270 0.221 0.294 0.159 0.113
Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable across columns: height and body mass at age one, five, and eight. Reported
independent variable: prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity (Exp). Additional independent variables
in all regressions: age of child in months, wealth index, number of older siblings, and dummies for gender,
mother’s height, mother’s education, ethnicity, antenatal care, weeks premature, month of birth, and
community.
The last three columns in Table 3.2 show that non-zero lower bounds on the effects of
exposure on body mass index are not identified at any age. As body mass is essentially a
measure of weight-for-height, these estimates are consistent with height and weight being
measures of the variation of health inputs in the long-run and short-run, respectively. Specif-
ically, prenatal exposure has a long-term impact on health as demonstrated by the effects
on childhood height but, after controlling for height, has no significant impact on the short-
term health measure (weight). Furthermore, the life-cycle impact of early malnourishment
on body mass is not fully understood. In general, studies have found that poor early nutri-
tion can lead to obesity later in life (Black et al. 2013). Such a mechanism is also consistent
with the weak effects on body mass as compared to height found in this chapter. However, I
will return to this discussion as further insights are revealed when examining how the timing
of exposure during the gestational period effects health outcomes at alternate ages.
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3.4.2 Socioeconomic Heterogeneity
In order to gain further insight on the mechanism at work in my baseline specification,
I next examine how the effects of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity vary with
socioeconomic status. Specifically, I estimate heterogeneity in effects across household wealth
and level of maternal education. As the benchmark specification identified no significant
relationships between overall exposure and body mass, I limit my analysis here to child
height outcomes.
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports results when adding an interaction between the exposure
measure and the household wealth index to the benchmark specification. Children in wealth-
ier households were significantly less adversely affected by prenatal exposure to reported
food scarcity. Moreover, the heterogeneity is quantitatively substantial. For example, the
estimated coefficients imply the minimum decrease in height by age five from a month of
exposure is 0.62 cm for a child from the tenth percentile of the wealth distribution compared
to 0.11 cm from the ninetieth percentile. By age eight, the estimated magnitude of the effects
has increased to 0.76 cm and 0.17 cm, respectively. These findings are consistent with the
related empirical literature which generally find stronger long term effects of early health
shocks on poor households (e.g. Currie and Hyson 1999). In the context of this study, results
suggests that poor families may be particularly vulnerable to variation in food availability
in Ethiopia.
There are several possible channels through which household wealth may influence the
effects of exposure. First, wealthier families may be better equipped to smooth consumption
during pregnancy over fluctuations in food prices or availability. As a result, children from
these households may directly experience a smaller exposure shock in-utero. Alternatively,
wealthier parents may have the financial means to make additional remedial investments
after birth. In this instance, even if actual in-utero exposure is similar across wealth levels,
exposed children from wealthier families may “catch up” to unexposed children through
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneity of Effects by Wealth and Maternal Education
Height1 Height5 Height8
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A — Heterogeneity by Household Wealth
Exp -0.064 -0.337* -0.439***
(0.226) (0.187) (0.139)
Exp×Wealth 0.101 0.202*** 0.233*
(0.084) (0.069) (0.117)
Panel B — Heterogeneity by Mother’s Education
Exp×MomEd
None -0.080 -0.430** -0.594***
(0.217) (0.202) (0.171)
1 to 4 years -0.085 -0.314 -0.419*
(0.242) (0.220) (0.212)
5 to 8 years 0.076 -0.224 -0.078
(0.261) (0.248) (0.247)
>8 years -0.062 0.035 -0.146
(0.302) (0.345) (0.401)
Obs 1,840 1,804 1,776
Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable across columns: height at age one, five, and eight. Reported independent variables:
interaction between prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity and wealth index (Panal A) or mother’s
education (Panel B). Additional independent variables in all regressions: age of child in months, wealth
index, number of older siblings, and dummies for gender, mother’s height, mother’s education, ethnicity,
antenatal care, weeks premature, month of birth, and community.
remedial health investments by the time the outcomes are measured. In either of these two
cases, it is important to note that the reported results may underestimate the total costs
of exposure as there may be additional utility costs due the reallocation of resources in
response to the shock. However, in contrast to the above channels which focus on responsive
investments by parents, the relationship between wealth and exposure could partially be a
mechanical feature of child health “production.” For example, many empirical and theoretical
studies argue that there are diminishing marginal returns to health investments. Thus, all
else equal, children with higher baseline levels of investment would be less adversely affected
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by an equivalent decrease in health inputs. In the context of this study, it seems plausible
that wealthier children could have higher baseline levels of prenatal health inputs compared
to their less wealthy counterparts (e.g. wealthier mothers have more substantial or varied
diets). If so, even if all mothers respond to exposure with equivalent level declines in health
inputs, wealthier children could be less adversely affected by exposure.
I next examine the heterogeneity of effects by level of maternal education based on
four schooling categories—none, lower primary (1-4 years), upper primary (5-8 years), and
secondary plus (>8 years). For ease of interpreting results, I drop the exposure measure
(Exp) from the benchmark specification and add interaction terms between exposure and
indicators for each level of maternal education. In this way, coefficients can be directly
interpreted as estimated effects of exposure for each category. Results are reported in Panel
B of Table 3.3. The estimated minimum effect of an additional month of exposure on a child
born to a mother with no education is -0.43 cm by age five and -0.59 cm by age eight. The
only other statistically significant effect is on height at age eight for children born to mothers
with one to four years of education (-0.42 cm). Statistically significant lower bounds at any
age can not be identified for children born to more educated mothers. However, although
not precisely estimated, there is a clear pattern of diminishing effects moving up the full
set of maternal education indicators for height at age five and eight. To the extent that
more highly educated mothers come from wealthier families, similar channels as detailed
above could be partially explaining these results. However, it could also be the case that
maternal cognitive capacity directly influences the effects of exposure. For example, more
highly educated mothers may have partially shielded their fetus from the effects of external
food scarcity. This would be consistent with much of the empirical evidence that maternal
education strongly impacts child health outcomes through improved child-care practices and
attitudes towards reproductive behavior (e.g. Thomas et al. 1991; Glewwe 1999).
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3.4.3 Timing of Prenatal Exposure
In addition to the benchmark measure of total prenatal exposure, it is also insightful to
analyze how effects are influenced by the timing of exposure over gestational periods of
development. In analyzing these differences, I follow the common practice of delineating
the prenatal period into three trimesters of pregnancy. These trimesters roughly coincide
with embryogenesis (first trimester), fetal development (second trimester), and a perinatal
period (third trimester). The empirical medical and economic literature examining prenatal
shocks during alternate gestational periods is substantial and quite varied. However, there
is considerable evidence that long-term health outcomes such as diabetes and heart disease
may be particularly sensitive to insults during the first trimester of gestation.11 In regards to
short-term effects, studies have shown significant impact on birthweight from shocks during
all stages of prenatal development, though a majority are focused around mid to late term
shocks (Currie and Almond 2011).
In order to empirically examine the importance of the timing of prenatal exposure to
seasonal food scarcity in Ethiopia, I translate my baseline exposure measure into distinct
trimester measures. In practice, I drop the total exposure measure (Exp) from the bench-
mark specification and add three measures indicating the number of exposure days during
each trimester. Results from this specification are reported in Table 3.4. The first three
columns show the effects of exposure by trimester of gestation on child height at ages one,
five, and eight. For example, exposure to an additional month of reported food scarcity
during the first trimester reduces child height by an estimated 0.44 cm by age five. While
coefficients are negative for all trimesters at age five, the magnitude of the estimate is con-
siderably larger and statistically significant only for the first trimester. By age eight, effects
are significant from exposure during all stages of gestation, but remain strongest for the first
trimester. As age five and eight measures were taken several years after gestation, I view
this as consistent with the empirical findings that health insults during the first trimester
11See, for example, the summary of studies in Almond and Mazumder (2011), Table A1.
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have stronger effects on long-term health outcomes.
Table 3.4: Effects of Exposure by Trimester of Gestation
Height1 Height5 Height8 BMI1 BMI5 BMI8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Trimester -0.199 -0.435** -0.626** 0.021 0.038 0.059
(0.173) (0.169) (0.267) (0.040) (0.037) (0.056)
2nd Trimester -0.025 -0.296 -0.353** -0.050* -0.028 -0.008
(0.245) (0.198) (0.128) (0.026) (0.030) (0.016)
3rd Trimester -0.042 -0.240 -0.449* -0.008 0.023 0.045
(0.152) (0.195) (0.220) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034)
Obs 1,840 1,804 1,776 1,748 1,804 1,776
R2 0.404 0.271 0.222 0.296 0.160 0.114
Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable across columns: height and body mass at age one, five, and eight. Reported
independent variables: binary indicators for "majority" exposure to seasonal food scarcity by trimester.
Additional independent variables in all regressions: age of child in months, wealth index, number of older
siblings, and dummies for gender, mother’s height, mother’s education, ethnicity, antenatal care, weeks
premature, month of birth, and community.
The last three columns of Table 3.4 give the estimated trimester effects on child body
mass. At age one, estimates on the last two trimesters are negative, though the coefficient is
only statistically significant for the second trimester. This implies that an additional month
of exposure to food scarcity during the second trimester reduces child body mass at age one
by an estimated 0.05 standard deviations. As age one measurements are taken relatively
soon after birth, I view these results as consistent with the empirical evidence that mid to
late term shocks have a stronger impact on birthweight. However, unlike effects on child
height, this result does not intensify with age, as the magnitude and statistical significance
fades away by age five. This is again consistent with body mass being a measure of health
inputs in the relatively short-term.
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3.5. ASSESSING ALTERNATE CHANNELS
3.5.1 Water Accessibility and Maternal Labor Supply
Due to the explicit nature of the survey data used to construct my exposure measure, I
argue that my results are primarily operating through nutritional intake fluctuations due
to seasonal variations in food availability and/or prices. However, it is conceivable that my
results could stem from other channels as well. For example, if seasonal variation in food
scarcity is highly correlated with water supply quality for some households, results could be
driven by the adverse disease environment that is known to accompany limited access to clean
water. In order to evaluate the evidence on the commonly proposed confounding channels
in developing countries—water quality and maternal labor supply—I examine heterogeneity
of effects by household sources of drinking water and prenatal exposure to increased labor
demand.
I begin by re-estimating the benchmark specification with the inclusion of an indicator
for household source of drinking water as well as its interaction with prenatal exposure to
reported food scarcity. I also include an interaction between the exposure measure and
the wealth index to help ensure that water source interactions are not simply reflecting
exposure effect heterogeneity by household wealth. Panel A of Table 3.5 reports results for
the altered specification. The water source reference group are those families who access
water through unprotected sources (e.g. river, pond, unprotected well). If access to clean
drinking water was indeed a confounding channel, we would expect households with better
access to protected water sources to be less adversely affected by the exposure measure (i.e.
positive interaction effects). Results indicate no statistically significant difference in the
effects of exposure between the reference group and those who access water through private
pipes, public standpipes/wells, or other sources. I will note, however, that in comparison
to the main exposure effect, the magnitude of several interaction coefficients are positive
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and substantial for the private pipe and other sources categories. However, the coefficients
are imprecisely estimated as these groups comprise only about 11% and 5% of the sample,
respectively. Moreover, as these categories are highly correlated with wealth, interaction
coefficients could also be reflecting socioeconomic heterogeneity not fully captured by the
wealth index interaction. A majority of sample households that did not obtain water through
unprotected sources did so through public standpipes or wells. For this group, interaction
estimates are both statistically insignificant and small in comparative magnitude. Thus, at
least tentatively, I find little evidence suggesting that results are being substantially driven
by seasonal variations in water supply quality.
An alternative concern is that agriculture production cycles may be correlated with ma-
ternal labor supply. Researchers have argued that seasonal changes in maternal labor supply
during pregnancy could impact fetal development (e.g. Strand et al. 2011). This may be
especially true in developing countries where labor is often concentrated in the physically
demanding agricultural sector. Although I do not have a direct measure of maternal labor
decisions throughout pregnancy, I use my measure of prenatal exposure to seasonal increases
in local labor demand (Labor) as a proxy for increases in maternal labor supply. As shown
in Panel B of Table 3.5, adding this proxy to the benchmark specification has little impact
on estimated effects of exposure to seasonal food scarcity. If anything, the magnitude of
impacts increase slightly suggesting benchmark results may be biased towards zero due to
correlations with maternal labor supply. This is perhaps unsurprising as it is quite plausible
that maternal labor supply is negatively correlated with food scarcity as well as child health
outcomes. It may be of interest to note that all point estimates on the maternal labor supply
proxy are negative and increasing in magnitude over time. As such, results could still be
consistent with the conjecture of maternal labor decisions as a separate channel through
which prenatal environment affects long-term health trajectories in Ethiopia.
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity by Water Source and Exposure to Seasonal Labor Demand
Height1 Height5 Height8
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A — Heterogeneity by Source of Water
Exp 0.040 -0.387* -0.491**
(0.251) (0.221) (0.215)
Exp×Wealth 0.147 0.167* 0.197
(0.097) (0.084) (0.140)
Exp×WaterSource
Private Pipe -0.213 0.236 0.219
(0.187) (0.300) (0.340)
Public Standpipe/Well -0.176 0.054 -0.005
(0.135) (0.207) (0.219)
Other -0.081 -0.048 0.357
(0.396) (0.507) (0.355)
Panel B — Effects of Exposure to Seasonal Labor Demand
Exp -0.060 -0.324* -0.445***
(0.205) (0.170) (0.131)
Labor -0.035 -0.069 -0.158
(0.118) (0.147) (0.133)
Obs 1,840 1,804 1,776
Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable across columns: height at age one, five, and eight. Reported independent variables:
prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity (both panels), interaction with wealth and water source (Panel
A), and exposure to increased seasonal labor demand (Panel B). Additional independent variables: age of
child in months, wealth index, number of older siblings, and dummies for water source (Panel A only),
gender, mother’s height, mother’s education, ethnicity, antenatal care, weeks premature, month of birth,
and community.
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3.5.2 Seasonal Patterns of Fertility
A remaining concern is the possibility that seasonal patterns of fertility within communities
could be biasing the results of the empirical analysis. Recall that while inclusion of month
of birth dummies controls for seasonal effects that occur at the country level, it is still
conceivable that seasonal fertility patterns could correlate with unobserved characteristics
within communities. If, for example, the pregnancies of wealthier women correlate with
periods when food is relatively plentiful, then results could be attributed to differences in
resources available to the child as opposed to exposure to food scarcity. Moreover, studies
have documented seasonal patterns of fertility across a variety of countries (e.g. Rajagopalan
et al. 1981; Panter-Brick 1996; Artadi 2005; Buckles and Hungerman 2013). In the developing
world, these patterns have been most commonly linked to the influence of agricultural cycles
on female labor supply, seasonality of marriage, and male migration.
In order to evaluate seasonal fertility patterns across the study sample, I begin by ex-
amining the timing of births by calender date (see Figure 3.5). There is a small decline
in births in August-September 2001 and January-March 2002, both followed by a period
of somewhat higher birthrates. However, there is no discernible correlation between these
birthrate patterns and the aggregated community food scarcity data shown in Figure 3.2.
Nonetheless, to more rigorously evaluate the influence of fertility patterns associated with
family demographics, I estimate the relationship between my measure of exposure to food
scarcity and household characteristics. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
ExpDaysidc = α + βXidc + θc + uidc (3.2)
where X are the same set of child and household characteristics used in the baseline speci-
fication and θ are community of residence indicators.
Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the estimated coefficients on observed characteristics from
equation 3.2. Virtually none of the child or household characteristics are related with the
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Figure 3.5: Date of Birth. Source: Author’s calculations using data from Young Lives Study,
Ethiopia. Histogram with 2 week window for each bin.
number of exposure days at conventional significance levels. The only exception is a negative
correlation with premature birth. However, this is be expected given the gestation period
for preterm births is by definition shorter than full-term births. An F -test cannot reject the
null-hypothesis that reported coefficients, other than those on premature birth, are equal
to zero. Moreover, according to a likelihood ratio test, inclusion of the other household
characteristics does not significantly improve the fit of the specification. As such, based on
observed characteristics, there is no evidence of substantial selection based on demographic
or socioeconomic seasonal patterns of fertility.
An alternate source of seasonal fertility bias could emerge as a result of unplanned preg-
nancies. Suppose, for example, that parents attempt to plan pregnancies around seasonal
variations in food availability because they believe exposure is “bad” for their unborn child.
In this case, children exposed to heavy amounts of food scarcity are more likely to be the
result of unplanned pregnancies. Moreover, several studies have linked unplanned pregnan-
cies to negative child outcomes including health status (e.g. Kost et al. 1998; Do and Phung
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Table 3.6: Dependent Variable: Prenatal Days of Exposure to Seasonal Food Scarcity
Panel A — Coefficients on Observed Characteristics
Male -1.804 (1.578) Antenatal Care
Older Siblings -0.377 (0.351) Low 1.371 (2.319)
Wealth Index -0.794 (1.276) Medium 1.569 (2.786)
Mother’s Education High -2.453 (2.758)
1 to 4 years 2.717 (2.108) Missing 1.459 (3.447)
4 to 8 years 3.234 (2.623) Mother’s Height (decile)
>8 years 5.431 (3.413) 2 2.302 (3.553)
Weeks Premature 3 4.171 (3.905)
1 to 2 weeks -1.288 (3.940) 4 -2.001 (3.669)
>2 weeks -15.46*** (5.539) 5 1.153 (3.679)
Unknown -17.12*** (5.541) 6 1.370 (3.545)
Child Ethnicity 7 1.464 (3.874)
Amhara -7.063 (4.990) 8 -2.841 (3.696)
Gurage -5.517 (6.488) 9 0.090 (3.654)
Oromo -5.873 (4.665) 10 0.199 (3.755)
Tigrian -9.290 (6.868) Missing -1.380 (3.485)
Wolavta 8.568 (10.48)
Obs 1890 F (25, 1840) 0.76 p < 0.800
R2 0.540 LR : χ2 (25) 19.34 p < 0.780
Panel B — Coefficients on Unplanned Pregnancy
Wanted Pregnancy
No 2.370 (1.737) Obs 1890
Missing -0.750 (4.612) R2 0.540
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include community
fixed-effects. Reported F-test for joint significance of all independant variables in Panel A except weeks
premature. Reported likelihood ratio test for null model including community fixed-effects and weeks
premature. Additional independent variables in Panel B: age of child in months, wealth index, number of
older siblings, and dummies for gender, mother’s height, mother’s education, ethnicity, antenatal care,
weeks premature, month of birth, and community.
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2010; Lokshin and Radyakin 2012). Under this scenario, the correlation between exposure
and child health could be the result of a higher proportion of unplanned pregnancies during
times of relative food scarcity.
In relation to unplanned pregnancies, the YLS survey asked participants the following
question:
At the time you became pregnant with ‘NAME’ did you want to become pregnant?
Based on the replies, about 35% of pregnancies were “unwanted” with another 5% of re-
sponses missing due to the mother not being present for the interview. I use these data to
evaluate the extent to which undesired pregnancies could be biasing my empirical results.
Specifically, I re-estimate equation 3.2 but also include an indicator variable that takes a
value of one if the pregnancy was reportedly “unwanted”. I also include a variable to indi-
cate if the response to pregnancy desirability was missing. As shown in Panel B of Table
3.6, the relationship between undesired pregnancies and days of exposure to seasonal food
scarcity is not statistically significant. The point estimate is also quantitative small—an
undesired pregnancy is correlated with an increase in exposure of about two days. As such,
I find little evidence of selection based on seasonal concentrations of unplanned pregnancies.
3.5.3 Mortality Selection
A final concern is the possibility of bias due to selective mortality on the basis of prenatal
exposure to seasonal food scarcity. The basic problem is that a given outcome is only
observed for children that survive to the age of measurement. If prenatal exposure has
differentiated mortality effects on children, the composition of survivors may be different
than it would have been in absence of exposure. However, mortality selection from a negative
in-utero health shock will generally result in estimates that understate the magnitude of
effects (Almond and Currie 2011). For example, if only the healthier or more robust of
the exposed children survive, then selective mortality of unhealthy children would be biasing
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results towards zero. Nonetheless, while I cannot directly evaluate the magnitude of selective
mortality that occurred in-utero, I can examine the evidence of selection bias between rounds
of data collection.
Approximately 4.7% of children were missing health outcomes at age five, and 6.1% at
age eight. Unfortunately, I cannot identify the proportion of missing data that occurs as
an explicit result of child mortality. However, the estimated child mortality rate between
ages one and five for Ethiopia in 2006 was 3.7%, suggesting a potentially significant role for
mortality in generating missing survey data (World Bank 2015). Moreover, while receiving
less attention in the literature, other proximate causes of missing data could bias results
through similar mechanisms as mortality selection.
In order to evaluate the potential role of this type of selection bias on results, I estimate
the probability of having missing data at ages five or eight using a simple linear probability
model:
Missidca = α + δExpdc + piHidc + κ (Expdc ×Hidc) + βXidc + µm + θc + uidc,
where Missidca is an indicator for a missing health outcome at age a, Hidc is a measure of
child health during the first round of data collection, and other explanatory variables are
as in the benchmark specification.12 In practice, I use height and body mass at age one as
alternate proxies for child health during the first round. The coefficient of interest is that
on the interaction between prenatal exposure and age one health. A significant coefficient
would reject the null hypothesis that exposure has no differentiated effects on the probability
of missing outcomes based on early health status.
Table 3.7 shows the relevant results from the probability estimates using first round height
or body mass as early measures of child health. All interaction coefficients are statistically
insignificant at conventional levels, providing no evidence of substantial selection bias due to
12Significance of results are robust to the use of a logistic regression. I present the linear probability model
for simplicity in interpreting interaction terms.
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mortality or other forces resulting in missing health outcomes. Moreover, although impre-
cisely estimated, point estimates for all interaction coefficients are negative. This tentatively
suggests that, if anything, healthier children are more likely to survive exposure than their
less healthy counterparts. This would be consistent with the results from the benchmark
specification underestimating the effects of prenatal exposure to seasonal food scarcity.
Table 3.7: Heterogeneity of Effects of Exposure on Probability of Missing Outcomes
Miss5 Miss5 Miss8 Miss8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp×Height1 -0.044 -0.038
(0.057) (0.059)
Exp×BMI1 -0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Obs 1,840 1,748 1,840 1,748
R2 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.045
Coefficients of linear probability model reported. Robust standard errors (clustered at the community
level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable across columns: missing
outcomes at age one and five. Reported independent variables: interaction between prenatal exposure to
seasonal food scarcity and round one height (meters) or body mass. Additional independent variables in all
regressions: height (round one), body mass (round one), age of child in months (round one), wealth index,
number of older siblings, and dummies for gender, mother’s education, ethnicity, antenatal care, weeks
premature, month of birth, and community.
3.6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents novel evidence on the impact of prenatal nutritional environment on
later childhood health outcomes. Among a cohort of Ethiopian children, I find that prenatal
exposure to months of reported seasonal food scarcity had a significant negative effect on
height by age five. Furthermore, these effects strengthen by age eight and are stronger when
exposure is concentrated in the first trimester, supporting early gestation as a “sensitive”
period of child development. In contrast, effects on child body mass are strongest when
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exposure is concentrated in the second trimester and tend to fade with time. Consistent
with other empirical studies, effects are also stronger for poorer children and those born to
less educated mothers. I also find no evidence that results are driven by commonly proposed
seasonal factors other than prenatal nutritional environment.
The impact of seasonal food scarcity on prenatal development has important policy im-
plications in Ethiopia and throughout much of the developing world. In the long-run, ad-
dressing the source of seasonal food insecurity likely involves substantial public investment
in transport infrastructure, storage and processing technologies, promotion of alternate crop
varieties, and agricultural market organization (World Bank 2012). In the meantime, so-
cial safety net programs can serve to combat the impact of seasonal food scarcities in the
short-run. However, these programs come at the cost of diverting limited public funds from
long-term investments and potentially creating a chronic dependency on food aid. As such,
understanding which populations are particularly vulnerable to seasonal food insecurity can
help efficiently target relief interventions.
In Ethiopia, policies such as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), launched in
2005, already aim to provide predictable support for seasonal variations in food availability.
Further targeting benefits towards pregnant women or those of child rearing age could be
a low-cost but effective modification to such a program. Information or family planning
campaigns could also be modified to emphasize the impact seasonal variations in maternal
diets can have on fetal development. Other low-cost interventions such as distribution of
nutrient rich season-specific recipes or improved home-based preservation technologies are
being piloted in other developing countries (Wijesinha-Bettoni et al. 2013). My findings
suggest such policies that mitigate the effects of seasonal food scarcities on the prenatal
nutritional environment could have significant and long lasting impacts on child health.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITION OF STATIONARY COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM
For ease of notation let ζ = {b, i, θ}. Given tax rate τ and relative prices Pi and Pm, a
stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of household decision rules:
{gc (ζ) , gs (ζ) , gq (ζ) , gi′ (ζ) , ga′ (ζ) , gg (ζ) , gh˜ (ζ)} ,
a household value function V (ζ), factor prices (w, r), government subsidies (pi, pe), and a
time invariant distribution of households across states Ψ, such that:
1. Given prices, government subsidies, and tax rates, the value and policy functions solve
the household decision problem.
2. Given prices, firms maximize profits
(a) w = (1− α)AKαH−α
(b) r = αAKα−1H1−α
3. Markets Clear
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(a) K =
´
ga′ (ζ) dΨ (ζ)
(b) H =
´
[(ψ (1− gs (ζ)) + 1 + κ) f (i′, gs (ζ) , gq (ζ) , θ)] dΨ (ζ)−
´
gh˜ (ζ) dΨ (ζ)
(c) Y =
´
[gc (ζ) + ga′ (ζ) + Pggg (ζ) + Pigi′ (ζ)] dΨ (ζ)− (1− δ)K = AKαH1−α
4. Government budget is balanced
(a) τ (wH + rK) =
´
[pqgq (ζ) + pigi′ (ζ)] dΨ (ζ)
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APPENDIX B
ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
1. Make initial guesses for the wage rate w, interest rate R, and tax rate τ .13
2. Compute household decision rules (see below).
3. Simulate a dynasty for 50,000 generations and discard the first 5,000 as a burn in
period. Aggregate assets, human capital, and education and early health expenditures
across the remaining generations.
4. Use the solutions to firm’s problem and government budget constraint to update w,
R, and τ . Iterate from step 2 until convergence.
Computing household decision rules All household decision rules are computed for
a discrete exogenous grid of (b, i, θ). For computation, I use a modified version of the
endogenous gridpoint method with occasionally binding constraints proposed by Hintermaier
and Koeniger (2010). The basic strategy is to combine the state vectors for early health i and
ability θ with an exogenous grid of early health choices i′ and then back out the remaining
implied decision rules and an endogenous state wealth grid bˆ. These “endogenous grid
13Subsidies to education are also guessed and updated to target public education spending when computing
the baseline economies.
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decision rules” are then interpolated back to the desired exogenous state space (b, i, θ). As
a preliminary to sketching the procedure it is convenient to rewrite the household decision
problem as:
V (b, i, θ) = max
c,s,h,i′,x′
{u (c) + βEz′,θ′ [V (b′, i′, θ′)]}
where x′ is defined as the non-stochastic portion of family wealth:
x′ = Ra′ +
(
1 +R−1κ
)
(1− τ)wh.
The algorithm to compute decision rules is as follows:
1. Assume the borrowing constraint does not bind. Using first order conditions (FOCs),
obtain s (i, θ) and h (i, θ) for each (i, θ). These are always the unconstrained choices
for s and h.
2. Guess initial derivatives of the value function
[
∂V
∂x′
]
and
[
∂V
∂i′
]
for state space (b, i, θ).
3. Interpolate to compute E
[
∂V
∂x′
]
and E
[
∂V
∂i′
]
for exogenous grid of (x′, i′, θ).
4. For each grid point in (i, θ, i′), compute the implied choice x′ as follows:
(a) Combine the unconstrained FOCs for x′ and i′ and interpolate over the exogenous
grid of x′ to solve.
(b) Check if borrowing constraint binds. If so, combine the constrained FOCs for h
and i′ and interpolate to find constrained x′.
5. Use the human capital production function, FOC for i′, definition of a′, and budget
constraint to compute
(
q, c, a′, bˆ
)
for all points in (i, θ, i′). This produces decision rules
for the state space
(
bˆ, i, θ
)
.
6. Interpolate the endogenous grid decision rules back to (b, i, θ).
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7. Compute decision rules where i′ “binds” high.14
(a) Compute consumption for grid of x′, then interpolate to solve the FOC for x′.
(b) Check if borrowing constraint binds. If so, then interpolate to solve the con-
strained FOC for h to find constrained x′.
8. Update
[
∂V
∂x′
]
and
[
∂V
∂i′
]
. Iterate from step 3 until convergence.
14Once state wealth b is sufficiently high, further increases will no longer result in increased early health
spending (assets have a higher return).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
Proof. For ease of exposition, I suppress controls (X,µ) and error terms (u) below. Due to
collinearity, Expdc + Exp∗dc = Kc, where Exp∗dc denotes exposure during the three months
after birth and Kc is some constant within each community. Denoting the total effect of
prenatal exposure to food scarcity γ and the total effect of exposure during the three months
after birth φ, the empirical specification can be derived:
Yidc = α + γExpdc + φExp∗dc
= α + γExpdc + φ (Kc − Expdc)
= α + (γ − φ)Expdc + φKc
= α + δExpdc + θc
where δ = (γ − φ) and the constant Kc is absorbed by the empirical community dummies
θc. The assumption that the effects of exposure to relative food scarcity are weakly negative
during pregnancy and the three months after birth implies γ, φ ≤ 0. Together with the
identity δ = (γ − φ), this assumption implies that max γ = δ, or alternatively min |γ| = |δ|,
where |.| denotes the absolute value.
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